

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS OF US CASUALTY
AVERSION ON US INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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JONATHON R. MOELTER, MAJ, USA
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Jonathon R. Moelter

Thesis Title: Effects of Foreign Perception of US Casualty Aversion on US International Relations

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chairman
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Ph.D.

_____, Member
COL (Retired) William W. Mendel, M.A.

_____, Member
LTC Paul L. Cal, M.A.

Accepted this 31st day of May 2002 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS OF US CASUALTY AVERSION ON US INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, by MAJ Jonathon R. Moelter, 99 pages.

Perceptions directly complement or hinder diplomatic success. Understanding other nations' perceptions of the US elucidates their probable action. Therefore, the fundamental research question posed in this thesis remains a pertinent one for officers, analysts, and policymakers in the future: How does the international perception that America is unwilling to risk casualties affect US foreign relations? The international perception that America is casualty averse reemerged after the hasty withdrawal of US forces from Somalia. Analysis of the US interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo identified five basic trends of international concern regarding the perception of US casualty aversion. These trends are as follows: (1) Aversion to casualties challenges US international leadership and credibility; (2) The US's presumed sense of invulnerability may result in preemptive attacks by the US; (3) A presumed strategy of zero casualties may directly shape US foreign relations; (4) Potential enemies can see US casualty aversion as an exploitable weakness; and (5) Past acts of apparent US casualty aversion continue to influence America's war on terrorism. US leaders must develop a strategy to reverse this international perception in order to maintain its credibility and legitimacy to act in world affairs.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. SOMALIA AND THE PERCEPTION OF CASUALTY AVERSION	6
3. BOSNIA AND US INTERVENTION	27
4. YUGOSLAVIA AND US INTERVENTION	44
5. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS	65
6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	78
APPENDIX	
A. METHODOLOGY	82
B. LITERATURE REVIEW	84
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	91
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	97
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT	98

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Sun Tzu said, “If you know both, the enemy and yourself, you will fight a hundred battles with out danger of defeat.” Part of knowing yourself and your enemy is knowing the perceptions you hold of your enemy and the perceptions he has developed about you. Perceptions are often considered reality and are acted upon as such. In future battles, the United States will most likely fight as part of a multinational force, or at least with external support. In the last five major operations the US participated in, the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and most recently Enduring Freedom, the US joined forces with a multitude of other countries in order to meet the mission objectives. Therefore, it is important to understand what the international perceptions are of the US. The topic of this research is how the international perception that Americans are unwilling to risk casualties in support of foreign policy affects US foreign relations.

This perception has the potential of affecting the US in international relations and shaping how both its allies and adversaries view US commitment abroad. For the past century, the United States has cultivated strong alliances with nations around the world. America united with Great Britain and other European countries to develop the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a means of countering the growth and threat of the Soviet Union. The underlining principle of NATO is the pledge that an attack on one country is an attack on all. This alliance has guaranteed US engagement in European affairs and the continued alliance between the US and its European friends. The US and its allies have thrived economically and have counted on the support of one another in times of conflict.

The perception that America is casualty averse has the potential of undermining the goals of the national security strategy of the United States and future allied support.

In answering how the international perception that Americans are unwilling to risk casualties in support of foreign policy affects US foreign relations, several subordinate questions must be answered.

First, what is the basis of the perception? How has the perception affected US military operations? How has US intervention shaped the perception? How have other nations or nonstate actors acted because of their perception of US casualty aversion? Finally, should the US be concerned about this foreign perception? Historical examples will provide insight of US military operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Research identified the events that led to US involvement in these conflicts, the scope of the conflicts, and the perceptions the international community took away from each conflict.

The historical background of these three conflicts will show how perceptions have affected US relations with its allies and coalition forces. It will also identify the perceptions of its adversaries, their perceptions of US commitment in past conflicts, how these perceptions affected their decisions, and what perceptions our current and potential adversaries hold concerning US resolve.

Throughout my career, I have served tours in Germany and Italy. I deployed in support of military operations in Southwest Asia, Somalia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. I have served on both joint and coalition staffs where I relied on the support of allied force representatives. As a staff officer of the four-star NATO Headquarters Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe staff during military operations in Kosovo, I witnessed the daily interaction between the US and NATO allies.

Perceptions have an influence as strong as facts. While serving on the staff of the NATO Headquarters, Stabilization Force (SFOR), Sarajevo, I saw the perceptions of the international military community. Through these experiences--bolstered by research using foreign materials--this thesis will seek to present a better understanding of how our allies and adversaries perceive America's resolve during military operations.

In review of recent past military operations, Somalia is an example of where the US sustained minimal casualties but did not have the resolve to continue its mission and achieve its military or political objectives. Before committing ground forces in Bosnia, President Clinton was concerned that the leaders of all warring factions sign a peace agreement to help ensure US soldiers did not find themselves in another Somalia situation. This research looked closely at how news of the eighteen American soldiers killed in Somalia became a major focus of the media and how members of Congress rushed to the floor to demand that the mission be aborted. Within forty-eight hours after the battle in Mogadishu became public, President Clinton declared that the US would withdraw from Somalia. Was this the plan of Somalia warlords? Is this the tactic future US adversaries will count on to defeat US forces? Is this the kind of asymmetric threat so widely talked about today? How did American policies during military operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo cultivate the international perception that America is casualty averse? Inasmuch as the US acts based on its perceptions of its allies and adversaries, it is important to understand and appreciate the perceptions of US allies and adversaries.

This chapter is an introduction to the thesis. Chapter 2 is a discussion of US involvement in Somalia. To understand the complex situation US forces faced and how

events quickly turned tragically wrong, the chapter will begin with a brief history of the country to include US involvement and the outcome of the conflict. Research identifies individual nation's perceptions, the effect on US foreign relations, and how the events of Somalia shaped US strategy for future foreign military operations.

Using an analogous approach, chapters three and four will address Bosnia and Kosovo, respectively. Chapter 5 is an analysis of the casualty aversion perception with illustrative examples of foreign news articles and other research materials. Chapter 6 is conclusions and recommendations for further study.

The major assumption of the thesis is that there is a perception among the international community that Americans are not willing to risk casualties in support of foreign policy or relations. Recognizing that foreign perceptions cannot be captured in their entirety, the thesis is based on an assumption that research found in foreign news media is fairly representative of the perceptions the general public of a country holds towards the US.

A limitation of this thesis is that research on foreign perceptions is limited to translated publications. This may lend itself to errors in interpretation. A second limitation is that America's war on terrorism is ongoing. Any discussion on US resolve or future perceptions concerning this conflict must be preliminary.

The thesis is limited to the period beginning with US involvement in Somalia, includes US activities in Bosnia and Kosovo, and ends with emerging perceptions from the war on terrorism. Analysis of the research material concentrated on US actions and the resulting international perceptions from these actions. The scope of this paper limits it to the analysis of international perceptions and will not answer the questions of who in

the US is casualty averse; the people, politicians, or the military. All leaders will attempt to limit friendly casualties in order to conserve combat power. An interesting question is when does conservation of forces becomes casualty aversion; however, it to is beyond the scope of this paper.

Sources of research will consist of professional and specialized books, as well as materials on the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The FBIS information specifically concerns individual country's perceptions of the US. FBIS is a database of English translated, foreign newspaper and periodical articles. It will constitute a principal source of information for analyzing other nation's perceptions of US commitment to world affairs.

CHAPTER 2

SOMALIA AND THE PERCEPTION OF CASUALTY AVERSION

The preceding chapter identified the following research question: How do the international perceptions of America's reluctance to risk lives affect US foreign relations. This chapter identifies US involvement in Somalia as the most recent basis for the perception. America's involvement in Vietnam has haunted the country for many years. After years of fierce fighting, thousands of casualties, and a presumed peace agreement, the US withdrew, allowing North Vietnam to overrun South Vietnam. The US military won many tactical battles; however, the senior military and political leadership lost the war at the strategic level. The Vietnam era saw unprecedented increases in scope and speed of media coverage. Battlefield scenes and both American and Vietnamese casualties seen on American television shaped US opinion and opposition to the war. The result of this war was a fear, at the highest levels of command and government, of getting bogged down in a protracted war, suffering unacceptably heavy casualties, with no clear strategic objectives or exit strategy. In 1983, a terrorist truck bomb killed 241 US military personnel at a Marine barracks in Beirut. This incident resulted in the US leaving Lebanon. Vietnam and Lebanon are examples where the US left an operation without achieving its objectives resulting in the perception of a casualty averse America. However, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the US deployed two Corps with a multitude of US Navy, Air Force, and Marine assets to liberate Kuwait. US casualty estimates ranged from 2,000 to 15,000, yet the US was willing to accept the risk. The US no longer appeared to be unwilling to risk casualties.

In 1992, the US entered Somalia as the lead element of a UN humanitarian mission. Within ten months of the deployment, the mission changed from a humanitarian to a peace enforcement operation. Nine months after the first US Marines landed on the beaches of Mogadishu, US Congress began to pressure President Clinton to develop an exit strategy. Even with congressional pressure, the President intended to continue the mission. He quickly changed his mind within forty-eight hours of the first casualty scenes broadcast on American television, announcing the US would leave Somalia. The perception that an adversary can inflict a few American casualties and the US will withdraw reemerged in international opinion. This chapter will discuss a brief history of Somalia, the United Nations' mission, the role the US played, and how the US declaration to withdraw shortly after the death of eighteen American soldiers once again initiated the international perception that America is not will to accept casualties in support of military operations.

History of Somalia

Prior to Siad Barre's rule from 1969 to 1991, most Somali families were self-sufficient. The clan was the essential unit of Somali culture and the only political entity known to Somalia. Clans functioned to protect outnumbered members, competing for grazing land or livestock, banding together to protect their land or possessions from other clans. Ownership of property was simply occupation of the land. "A Somali proverb nicely captures the uneasy nature of clan bonds: 'Me and my clan against the world; me and my brother against the clan; me against my brother.'"¹ Not understanding this clan system caused problems during future UN and US humanitarian efforts in the country. Clans that controlled the seaports and airports and the distribution of humanitarian relief

supplies were unwilling to turn this control over to the UN and lose the opportunity for further financial gain and power.

Siad Barre's Rule

Siad Barre came to power by coup in 1969. For the next eight years the US and Soviet Union vied for favorable relations with Barre in order to secure naval basing on the Indian Ocean, flanking the Middle East and the oil shipping lanes to Western Europe. In the end, the US achieved its objective by gaining an agreement with Barre to make the northwest port of Berbera the US Rapid Deployment Force's (RDF) Indian Ocean base. Millions of dollars of trade between Russia and Somalia dropped to zero.² The US maintained diplomatic ties with Somalia and provided defensive arms and financial support; however, after the end of the Cold War, the US became less interested in the Horn of Africa and Somalia.

Siad Barre did not treat all Somalis equally. At the expense and persecution of others, he favored his own Marehan subclan first and then the larger Darod clan. Barre ruled through widespread discrimination and persecution; however, he did attempt to improve the country. He nationalized the agricultural industry, developed health and education infrastructures, instituted Somalia's first written language, centralized the national budget, nationalized land, imposed wage and price controls, and attempted to ban the drug khat. Still, clan rivalries and Soviet influence resulted in the continuation of executions, persecutions, and discrimination to solidify Barre's rule. These factors were causes for the eventual overthrow of Siad Barre and his government.

The Introduction of General Mohammed Aidid

One of Siad Barre's staunchest opponents was General Mohammed Farah Aidid. Once Barre took power in 1969, he imprisoned Aidid. In October 1975, Barre released Aidid, who then went on to serve with distinction in the Ogaden war against Ethiopia. After the war, Aidid served as a presidential staffer, a member of Parliament, and Somalia's ambassador to India. He covertly helped organize the United Somali Congress (USC), one of many political groups that emerged throughout the late 1980's, and opposed Siad Barre's rule. After Barre's defeat in the Ogaden and the failed Majerteen coup against Barre's government, Barre implemented a policy of systematic persecution. He sent forces to rape Majerteen women, abducting their young girls, and decimating their livestock by destroying their reservoirs. Continued acts of persecution resulted in calls for Barre's resignation. Barre's ruthlessness also prompted a cut in all US aid. By now, foreign trade was nearly nonexistent. For the next two years, Barre failed to regain power. Supporters of the USC captured Barre and exiled him to Nigeria in January 1991.

The naming of Ali Mahdi interim president of Somalia resulted in clashes between the new government and followers of Aidid. Widespread anarchy plagued the country while at least thirteen clans and subclans fought for regional or national control.³ Warlords and their gunmen lived in luxury, while Mogadishu became a wasteland. No diplomats were left, no businesses were open, and artillery fire prevented ships carrying food and humanitarian supplies from docking at the port. Aidid was a Mogadishu native and former political prisoner whose own clan suffered under Barre's abuse. He became a folk hero. In July 1991 Aidid was elected USC chairman. Thousands of civilians and combatant clansmen died in tribal fighting throughout the remainder of 1991. In

northwest Somalia, local leaders were pushing to succeed from Somalia and form the separate country of Somaliland. The country as a whole was without any form of recognized central government. Heavy fighting with clans and subclans continued at a time of serious drought. This combination of war and drought was disastrous. Starvation, severe malnutrition, and disease threatened more than half the total 4.5 million population of the country. Overall, an estimated 300,000 people died.

UNOSOM I

On 23 January 1992, the UN Security Council passed a resolution that imposed an arms embargo on Somalia, called for humanitarian aid, and urged a cease-fire. The United States opposed any proposal to send peacekeeping troops to Somalia. The international community did not perceive this as US aversion to casualties but instead as US apathy toward human suffering in Africa and greater US focus on assisting the European community in solving the problems in the former Yugoslavia. In the US, opposition to supporting UN operations in Somalia was based on a fear of the operation becoming “another Vietnam,” a protracted operation with no clear objectives or exit strategy. On 3 March, Aidid and Ali Mahdi agreed to a cease-fire resulting in the agreement of the UN to dispatch a small team of twenty observers to supervise the cease-fire and lay the foundation for humanitarian aid projects. A day after its arrival Somali gunmen killed a UN driver. The UN secretary-general’s emissary to Somalia, James Jonah, recommended additional technical assessments of Somalia’s peacekeeping and relief needs and the deployment of UN observers. The UN established the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) in April of 1992. Its goal was to facilitate humanitarian aid to people trapped by the ongoing civil war and famine. The strength of

UNOSOM I began with 50 unarmed but uniformed United Nations military observers and a 500-man infantry unit to escort UN convoys. UNOSOM I's mission was to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and to provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment, and supplies at the seaports and airports, and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centers throughout the city and the immediate surrounding area. The mission later expanded into an attempt to help stop the conflict and reconstitute the basic foundation of a viable state.

Meanwhile, conditions within Somalia continued to deteriorate. The UN declared that it was “feeding the people of Somalia”⁴ even as the cease-fire began to crumble. In July 1992, getting food and supplies from the port into the city of Mogadishu was becoming a dangerous task. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that, “The desperate and complex situation in Somalia will require energetic and sustained efforts on the part of the international community to break the circle of violence and hunger.”⁵ Throughout August and September of 1992, UNOSOM I's authorized strength rose to over 4,200 troops and advisors. The Secretary-General sought to improve the implementation of humanitarian action under the 100-Day Action Program for Accelerated Humanitarian Assistance.⁶

Implementing this new program proved difficult because of disagreements between the Somali factions. In August of 1992, the United States initiated Operation Provide Relief. U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules transport planes began bringing food and medical supplies to the interior cities of Somalia. This protracted airlift campaign fed the starving Somalis but did not require the United States to commit a single ground troop. By November 1992, when President Bush announced the plan to commit ground forces

under Operation Restore Hope, more than 1,400 sorties had successfully provided critical supplies to the Somali people. In October 1992, Aidid declared the intolerance in Mogadishu of the Pakistani UNOSOM battalion. The warring factions began attacking UNOSOM facilities throughout Mogadishu. By late 1992, looting and shelling closed the port of Mogadishu, preventing the offloading of humanitarian supplies. Somalia was more dangerous than ever. US Congress and members of the UN Security Council all pressured President Bush to take further action in helping to solve the problems of Somalia.

UNITAF

In the summer of 1992, the Senate and House passed concurrent resolutions urging President Bush to work with the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force in Somalia. Support for US involvement continued to build as haunting images of starving children began to appear on American televisions. Although more than 1,400 C-130 sorties successfully provided supplies to the Somali people, the problems UNISOM was having with the distribution of supplies continued. In November of 1992, President Bush offered US resources and leadership to help with the humanitarian mission in Somalia. On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously welcomed the US offer to help create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and authorized the use of all necessary means to do so.

President Bush responded to the UN Security Council with a decision on 4 December to initiate Operation Restore Hope. The US assumed command of the new operation in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. On 4 December 1992 in his address to the nation on the situation in Somalia, President Bush reported that he had

deployed US armed forces to Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis and a UN Security Council Resolution determining that the situation constituted a threat to international peace. In an address to the people of Somalia President Bush said, “We come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed.”⁷ He also told them that the US respected Somalia’s sovereignty and independence and did not plan to dictate political outcomes.

The Secretary-General communicated to President Bush his concept of a division of labor between the United Nations and the US. He welcomed the lead the US was willing to take in creating the secure environment necessary for the UN to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and economic reconstruction of the Somalia nation.

The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) came ashore on the beaches of Mogadishu without opposition on 9 December 1992. UNITAF consisted of 28,000 US forces and augmented by 17,000 troops from over 20 countries.⁸ The headquarters of UNITAF was the US Central Command. The objectives of UNITAF were to secure the major air and seaports, secure essential installations and food distribution points, and provide free passage of relief supplies by providing security for convoys and organizations supplying humanitarian relief. In accomplishing these objectives, the US limited disarmament to areas of positive control or where soldiers happened to be and saw the weapons. More Somalis would have been willing to turn over their weapons if the US could guarantee their safety; however, UNITAF forces could not protect the entire country. Armed Somali militia provided stability to some areas not covered by UNITAF forces. Although there was evidence of cooperation

between UNITAF and Aidid, armed conflict between clans continued as near as a few kilometers from the American headquarters. The press, Somalis, and international relief agencies pushed for US forces to open a route to Baidoa, the city hardest hit by famine. However, it took US forces a full week to move the two hundred miles northwest of Mogadishu. American commanders explained that logistical considerations necessitated the delay. They believed the Biadoa environment was calm but US commanders were still concerned about risks. As a USMC major noted, “There’s a deterrent in sheer numbers, and you can’t get sheer numbers without logistical support.”⁹ This explanation expressed a pillar in projecting power--to establish a dominant military presence while subjecting soldiers to the smallest possible risk. Nevertheless, many observers saw the US approach as overcautious. This interpretation was the first emergence of the perception of a casualty averse American force, even to the detriment of the mission.

The United States military stressed the deterrent effect of sheer numbers and the overwhelming show of force. However, the Somalis were not interested in the sort of battle that would call for such a massive force or that could cause them heavy casualties. Somali clans were not fighting to protect their country but rather to keep the flow of money and materials into their hands. US commanders were beginning to believe Somalia did not need a military force as much as it needed a police force and soldiers were not the force for such a mission.

US Marine Private First Class Domingo Arroyo was the first American killed in Somalia. He was shot and killed on 13 January 1993 while on a routine foot patrol near the Mogadishu International Airport. This incident and the ongoing violence convinced the US command that disarmament had to become part of their mission. Robert Oakley,

US special envoy to Somalia, was able to persuade Ali Mahdi and Aidid to turn over many of their *technicals* to UNITAF to be disabled and stored.¹⁰ US marines began missions raiding arsenals and gun markets. Marines broke into buildings, searched them, and seized small arms. These operations resembled the house-to-house weapons searches UNITAF had sworn not to implement. UNITAF forces widened the distance between them and the people of Somalia.

In early January, a French colonel leaked the US plan to turn over the command of the Somali operation to the UN. This brought concern to both the UN and US chains of command. First, they were concerned that within their organizations that there would be problems in operational security. Second, there was a fear that the local clans would believe that if the US were leaving, the situation could return to how it was before the US arrived. They could again extort money from relief agencies and control the flow of humanitarian supplies. By early February, the fears began to prove true. UNITAF personnel strength dropped from over thirty-eight thousand in mid-January to twenty-four thousand.¹¹ In late February, President Clinton declared the UNITAF mission a success and in March, he announced the transition of the Somalia mission to the control of the United Nations and UNISOM II.

UNOSOM II

On 3 March 1993, the UN Secretary-General recommended to the UN Security Council the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He articulated that the UNITAF operations had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and the improved success of humanitarian assistance. However, despite the improvements made under UNITAF control, it had not established a secure environment and incidents of violence

continued. There was no effective government in the country, no civilian police, and no national army. The Security threat to personnel operating for the humanitarian relief of the country was still high. Therefore, if the transition was to occur, UNOSOM II should have been empowered to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia and assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economic, political, and social life by recreating a democratic Somali state.¹²

The mission of UNOSOM II was to complete the tasks begun by UNITAF to restore peace, stability, law, and order through disarmament and reconciliation of the clans.

Its main responsibilities were monitoring the cessation of hostilities; preventing resumption of violence; seizing unauthorized small arms; and maintaining security at seaports, airports, and lines of communication required for delivery of humanitarian assistance; continuing mine clearing; and assisting in repatriation of refugees in Somalia. UNOSOM II would also assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life, recreate a Somali State based on democratic governance, and redevelop the country's economy and infrastructure. The mandate of UNOSOM II, as approved by the UN Security Council, covered the whole territory of Somalia and included:

- monitoring to ensure that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented;
- preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action;
- maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which would have been brought under international control;
- seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements;
- securing all ports, airports, and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;

- protecting the personnel, installations, and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as NGOs;
- continuing mine-clearing, and;
- repatriating refugees and displaced persons within Somalia.¹³

By 4 May 1993, UNITAF transferred control of the UN Somalia operations to UNOSOM II. The Secretary-General appointed Admiral Jonathan Howe (Retired USN) as his new Special Representative for Somalia effective 9 March 1993, and Lieutenant-General Çevik Bir of Turkey as Force Commander of UNOSOM II.

The UNOSOM II force consisted of twenty-eight thousand troops from thirty different armies. UNOSOM II commanders struggled with the difficulties in melding units of different skills, experience, and languages into a cohesive force. Different peacekeeping philosophies were also an issue in commanding and controlling this new organization. Some commanders, such as the French, held a reconciliatory attitude towards Aidid and proposed suspending combat operations. Some countries, such as Italy, threatened to withdraw their troops when they did not agree with the philosophy of UNOSOM II's command. Because of the problems involved with the establishment of UNOSOM II, Aidid felt he could manipulate the situation to his advantage. When Robert Oakley refused to enter a partnership with the Somali leader, Aidid claimed a breach of promise and portrayed the United States as a colonizing force to resist. He believed the US was leaving Somalia and US dedication to the mission was very low. If Somali forces could achieve even a minimal number of US or UN casualties, US resolve would fall apart and Aidid would regain control of his country.

In February 1993, Majerteen clansmen attacked Aidid's forces in Kismayu. In a radio address, Aidid accused US and Belgian troops of aiding in the Kismayu attacks and

called on Somalis to “defend your freedom, your honor and do not allow yourselves to fall under colonial rule.”¹⁴ By the end of February, anti-American riots and violence were prevalent throughout Mogadishu. Aidid attended the UN-sponsored conference in early January and dominated the proceedings by blocking the achievement of its objectives until UN representatives left the table.

The March summit in Addis resulted in an agreement to set up a provisional government in the form of a seventy-four member Transitional National Council. However promising this agreement sounded, it did not decide essential details such as determining membership in the council, drawing geographical boundaries, or settling the secessionist claims to the northwest quadrant of Somalia. No timetable was set for the emplacement of the new government. The agreement also called for disarmament of the local population by the end of June.¹⁵

In May, Admiral Howe began the process of empowering Somalia’s transitional government by promoting Somalia’s police and judicial systems and allowing UNOSOM II to enforce the cease-fire provisions of the Addis agreement. Initially, Aided cooperated with Admiral Howe. He asked Admiral Howe for support of a reconciliation conference between southern Somalia and the province of Galcayo. When Admiral Howe insisted the UN and not Aidid sponsor the conference, Aidid thought the UN was attempting to subvert his leadership and felt betrayed. Aidid rejected the UN sponsorship and again began his verbal attacks against the UN.¹⁶

Aidid showed nothing but contempt for the UN operation. He continued to use radio messages to characterize UN soldiers as an occupation force. Warlords only dominate in war and Aidid was waging war against the UN. He used Radio Mogadishu

to accuse the UN of asserting colonial authority and urged Somalis to boycott the UN conference on Galcayo.

After the Galcayo conference reached no agreement, UNOSOM II officials decided to use coercive methods against Aidid in an attempt to assert UN strength. Weapons depots inspections increased and on 4 June Admiral Howe announced the enforcement of the Addis Ababa disarmament agreement. UNOSOM II also announced it would shut down Radio Mogadishu because of its UN criticism.

On 5 June 1993, UN officials sent Pakistani forces to southern Mogadishu, an area dominated by Aidid, to inspect and inventory a weapons storage facility. When the Pakistani forces arrived, they met protestors angered by UN policies. When the force left the facilities, Aidid's militia ambushed it. The US Quick Reaction Force (QRF), assisted by Italian forces, deployed to the site and dispersed Aidid's men. Casualties consisted of Twenty-four Pakistanis killed and fifty-six other UNOSOM troops wounded during the skirmish.

The UN Security Council declared the attacks "calculated and premeditated" and passed the resolution on 6 June authorizing all necessary measures against those responsible for the attack and the disarmament of all Somalia parties as agreed at the Addis conference.¹⁷ UN efforts now focused on the hunt for Aidid. UNOSOM II used Pakistani, Nigerian, Moroccan, Italian, and Malaysian units to conduct air attacks and arms searches in Aidid's areas in and around Mogadishu. Finally, after Moroccan forces suffered heavy casualties during a search on 17 June, Admiral Howe posted a \$25,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of Aidid. During a press conference, President Clinton said Aidid's forces were responsible "for the worst attack on UN

peacekeepers in three decades. We could not let it go unpunished.”¹⁸ The US sent CIA agents to Somalia to aid in the hunt for Aidid.

On 12 July, the US QRF led a raid on Aidid’s headquarters, confiscated documents, communications equipment, and weapons. However, Aidid and his military officers were again able to escape capture. Fifty-four Somalis were killed, with many more wounded during this attack. Shortly after this raid, angry Somali mobs killed four Western journalists and Aidid urged the people of Somalia to kill Americans.

On 21 August, a remotely controlled device exploded under a US vehicle killing four American soldiers. US Army General Montgomery, Deputy Commander UNISOM II, requested additional forces and heavy armored vehicles from the US. US Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, agreed to deploy 400 US Ranger and Delta forces to Somalia. However, he refused to deploy the tanks and armored fighting vehicles that Montgomery felt necessary to protect US soldiers. Aspin feared Congressional support of the operation was wavering, and he believed any additional deployment of troops would be contradictory to the planned withdrawal of forces from Somalia.

With the additional 400 Delta and Ranger forces in September, UNOSOM II increased the number of raids conducted. Aidid and his senior advisors evaded capture while casualties escalated throughout Mogadishu. UNISOM casualties grew to twenty-one Nigerian, Moroccan, Pakistani, and Italian forces killed and nearly fifty wounded during the month. On 23 September, Aidid’s forces downed a US helicopter, killing three Americans. The US appeared to use the same tactic during numerous raids. Delta Force and Rangers would rappel into a given area, attacking to seize prisoners. Helicopters would hover overhead to observe and control crowds and provide fire support

to the troops on the ground. Aidid's forces understood that to defeat Task Force Ranger, they must neutralize its helicopter support and surround the ground contingent by an overwhelming force.¹⁹ They found having women and children stretch cloth above them while they shot through or around it was the best form of camouflage against the helicopters.²⁰ Although the Somalis did not have a specific, well-developed plan to counterattack Task Force Ranger, they knew another attack was imminent and they were prepared. On 3 October, Aidid's men were alerted that helicopters had lifted off from US bases. Somali direct fires shot down two incoming US helicopters. The fierce fighting that ensued lasted fifteen hours resulting in eighteen US soldiers killed, and another seventy-six wounded. Estimated Somali casualties were more than 300 dead and over 800 wounded.

The Outcome of US Participation in Somalia

On 5 October televisions across the US displayed scenes of a dead American soldier dragged naked through the streets of Somalia. Congress concluded--or at least feared--that the American people wanted out of Somalia. President Clinton addressed the nation within forty-eight hours of the news reports; promising that within six months, US soldiers would leave Somalia.²¹ He also ordered US commanders to stop hunting for Aidid. The US was prepared to negotiate with Aidid and sent Robert Oakley as the US special envoy to Somalia. He was successful in securing the release of a US pilot and Nigerian soldier being held by Aidid's men. Oakley then began searching for a political solution--not military--to Somalia's problems. Following the US example, Boutros Ghali asked the UN Security Council to reduce the Somalia mission in order to facilitate

political reconciliation. Within one year of the US withdrawal, UN forces left Somalia in March 1994, marking the end to the UNOSOM II mandate.

Two trends in international perceptions resulted from US involvement in Somalia. First, the US will limit its participation in foreign military operations where it cannot mitigate the risk of casualties. Second, the US will not be able to maintain the necessary support to achieve its objectives if it takes even minimal casualties.

Somalia operations not only caused the Clinton administration to shift and clarify US policy on the use of military force, it cultivated the perception in the international community that the US will only get involved where there is little to no risk of US casualties. According to author Charles Stevenson, a set of principles on the use of military forces evolved during the Clinton Administration and stood as guidelines for future military action.

Important, but not vital, interests call for limited and conditional use of military force. The conditions include likely success, costs and risks commensurate with the interest at stake, and the failure of other means used to achieve the objectives. Prior to committing military force, the administration pledges to consider several critical questions: . . . What are the potential costs--both human and financial--of the engagement? Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?²²

These principles demonstrate the US apprehension to becoming engaged in foreign affairs when the potential human costs may be high and when the political leaders cannot ensure the continuous support of the American people. When planning any operation, the US evaluates its options based on the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability (FAS) test. After Somalia, US leaders placed greater emphasis on the acceptability of an option more than the other two FAS test criteria.

The international perception that the US will not be able to maintain the necessary support or resolve to achieve its objectives is the more dangerous of the two trends in perceptions resulting from Somalia. This perception could influence the actions of our potential adversaries or allies. Author Lester H. Brune clearly articulated the potential results of the perception when he wrote, “Aidid’s tactic of ‘killing Americans’ achieved its goal.”²³ America’s potential adversaries may see this as a reproducible tactic to use against the US. The quick withdrawal of US forces from Somalia may have influenced Osama bin Laden’s terrorist activities. In the past, the US conducted limited air or cruise missile strikes in retribution for terrorist attacks against the US. After the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia, bin Laden characterized the US as “cowards . . . afraid of death . . . like mice.”²⁴ Based on Somalia and the historical pattern of US retribution to terrorist attacks, Osama bin Laden may have believed the risk and extent of America’s counteraction to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US would be acceptable.

N. C. Menon of India’s *The Hindustan Times* believes the near-instantaneous media coverage of the battlefield, as demonstrated in Somalia, will lull hostile forces into believing that all they must do is bloody US forces to cause them to withdraw. In his article, “Decline in American Power Noted, Analyzed,” he stated, “The American public does not mind battles that resemble video games, as in the Persian Gulf, but they have no stomach for guts and gore.”²⁵

According to Bob Woodward’s book, *The Commanders*, during planning for US operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf, emphasis was on deploying an overwhelming force, gaining the advantage through surprise, and achieving a quick decisive victory.²⁶ Leaders took steps to mitigate the risk of casualties; however, it was not the most

important consideration. The risk of casualties, even when estimated to be possibly as high as 2,000 to 15,000, was the cost associated with achieving US national objectives. Now the risk of casualties appears to be very high on US leadership's concerns and may be an exploitable weakness.²⁷ If a few US casualties cause the hasty withdrawal of US military forces, US leaders' casualty aversion will squander the sacrifices soldiers make and the risks they take. Additionally, if the risk of losing as few as eighteen soldiers is too excessive, then the US status as a superpower will degrade and the international community will question US credibility and legitimacy.

The following chapter will show how the evolving US policy on the use of military force was not only influenced by the US involvement in Somalia but also, how other nations perceive US resolve in support of foreign military operations.

¹Jonathan Stevenson, *Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 3.

²Ibid., 18.

³Ibid., 34.

⁴Ibid., 37.

⁵United Nations, "UNOSOM I" [article on-line]; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom1b.htm>; Internet; accessed on 20 September 2001.

⁶Ibid.

⁷George Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia," 4 December 1992 [on-line]; available from <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu>; Internet; accessed on 20 September 2001.

⁸UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe.

⁹Stevenson, 56.

¹⁰Ibid., 64. *Technical*s were civilian pickups, jeeps or other similar vehicles with large crew-served weapons, such as .50-caliber machine guns or antitank weapons systems, mounted on them.

¹¹Ibid., 57.

¹²United Nations, “UNOSOM I.”

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Stevenson, 78.

¹⁵Ibid., 80-82.

¹⁶Lester H. Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992-1998* (Claremont: Regional Books, 1998), 29.

¹⁷Ibid., 30.

¹⁸Ibid., 32.

¹⁹Ibid., 92.

²⁰Captain Haad, Frontline Interview, “Ambush in Mogadishu,” [article on-line]; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/haad.html>; Internet; accessed on 25 September 2001. Captain Haad was one of the sector commanders for General Aidid’s militia in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993.

²¹Steven Kull, “Misreading the public mood,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 51, no. 2 (March-April 1995): 56.

²²Charles A. Stevenson, “The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the use of Force,” *Armed Forces and Society* 22, no. 4 (summer 1996): 514-18.

²³Brune, 33.

²⁴Hamid Mir, “Interview with Osama bin Laden in Jalalabad,” *Islamabad Pakistan* in Urdu, 18 March 1997, FBIS Document ID: FTS19970319001325.

²⁵N. C. Menon, “Decline in American Power Noted, Analyzed,” Delhi *The Hindustan Times* (in English), 2 December 1996, FBIS Document ID: FTS19970626002297.

²⁶Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1991).

²⁷“New Book Published by PLA Literature and Art Publishing House Calls for Countering Military Powers by Hook or by Crook,” Hong Kong *Ming Pao* (in Chinese), 2 July 1999, A13, FBIS Document ID: 19990702000375.

CHAPTER 3

BOSNIA AND US INTERVENTION

The last chapter identified Somalia as beginning the reemergence of the international perception that the US is unwilling to accept casualties. This chapter will provide a brief history of the Bosnia conflict. The purpose is to discuss why the US was apprehensive in becoming involved in the conflict and explore how the casualty perception affected the military operation and the relations with other nations involved.

World War II Yugoslavia

World War II brought strife to Yugoslavia. Hitler invaded Yugoslavia in 1941 and parceled out the country between Nazi German allies and local supporters. Thousands of Yugoslavians not only died in battles against the occupying forces, ethnic cleansing between states also killed many people.

The Yugoslav Communists (or Partisans) led by Josip Broz Tito, organized their own multi-ethnic resistance group. The Partisans engaged their guerrilla units against the Germans, Chetniks, Ustasha, and anyone who did not support their struggle. Tito's Partisans did not care if their attacks would provoke the Germans to savage reprisals against civilian villages. They believed the populace would have no choice but to join their cause to avenge the occupying forces. The Partisans considered anyone who failed to join them as German collaborators and subject to Partisan reprisals. Tito tied down Axis troops and soon received the support of Allied, air-dropped supplies.

Cold War Yugoslavia

The continuous flow of allied military aid enabled Tito's Partisans to emerge as the victors of Yugoslavia. They celebrated their victory with mass executions of tens of thousands of Croatian and Slovenian militiamen who surrendered at the end of the war. Tito declared himself the leader of Yugoslavia and ruled as a dictator for thirty-five years until his death.

Tito reconstituted Yugoslavia into six republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonian, and Slovenia. Tito purged economic reformers of the party because he believed they damaged national unity. Tito also removed those whom he perceived as advocates of reform, such as successful businessmen, editors, journalists, university professors, and senior bureaucrats. During the 1970s, Yugoslavia became more dependent on financial aid from the West. The decline of the world market during the 1970s caused reductions in loans and grants from the US and Western Europe and greater economic instability in Yugoslavia.¹

Tito's relationship with the Soviet Union and the Western Allies was quite similar to that of Somalia's Aidid. Since 1950, the United States all but guaranteed Yugoslavia's independence and security against the Soviet threat. The US consistently and unconditionally offered substantial political, economic, and military aid. In 1957, when the US attempted to place conditions on military aid to Yugoslavia, Tito cancelled the 1951 US-Yugoslav Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Tito publicly denounced the US attempted political influence of Yugoslavia. The US felt its interests in Yugoslavia were nearly vital, therefore it continued to provide aid to Yugoslavia despite the fact that Tito entered special arrangements for military collaboration with the Soviet Union.

Any shift of Yugoslavia back to Soviet dominance would be a major setback for the Western Allies. Former US ambassador Laurence Silberman articulated Tito's contempt for both US policy and Western values by writing, "Yugoslavia sees the United States as a milk cow rather than a bull--all teats and no horns."² This contest between the US and the Soviet Union resulted in the development of countries whose economy and strength depended on the receipt of foreign aid. Cold War Somalia and Yugoslavia both exemplify how the US made exceptions for how a country dealt with its internal problems and its external alliances. The US overlooked agreements made between countries, contradictory to US interests, in order to maintain diplomatic relations and prevent the spread of Soviet influence.

After Tito

In 1974, Tito had Yugoslavia's constitution rewritten again. This new constitution provided for two presidencies. In the first case, Tito headed the government as the President of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC). An eight-man presidency made up the second, consisting of one elected representative for each republic's assembly and a chairman that rotated annually. Tito died in 1980 with no one to assume the power vacuum his death caused.

Yugoslavia's economic failures reached a breaking point by 1987. The federal government attempted changes to its socialist policies to receive additional international economic aid. Leaders of Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia adamantly opposed continued federal assistance to the five less developed republics and instead sought to bolster their own republics' economies. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund attempted to force Yugoslavia to implement drastic economic reforms to a free market

economy and to create a sound budget with the ability to repay loans. These reforms meant cutting social programs, ending inflation, and privatizing business, which would result in lower wages, unemployment, and a sharp decrease in welfare benefits. These reforms also increased the growing tensions between the republics.

From 1987 to 1990, Yugoslavia's central government failed to resolve the country's economic and political problems. The world saw the fall of Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1992 as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia all seceded from Yugoslavia. The first region to secede was Slovenia. Yugoslav military forces initially attempted to stop the secession but shortly withdrew.³

Croatia declared its secession on 25 June 1991. Soon after the declaration, Serb forces invaded, causing the outbreak of a civil war. The UN sponsored a cease-fire in January 1992 but hostilities resumed later in the year when Croatia fought to regain territory taken by the Serbs. In August 1994, Croatian forces recaptured Krajina, forcing some 150,000 Serbs to flee to other Serbian areas of Bosnia.⁴ Serb President Milosevic challenged the government of Bosnia by targeting Bosnia's Serb population with propaganda alleging atrocities against Serb people. He staged protest against Bosnia's Muslim and Croatian politicians, alleging a Muslim plot to dominate the Serbs. Milosevic financed the Bosnian Serb Democratic Party (SDS) led by Radovan Karadzic.

The population of Bosnia was comprised of three ethnic groups. Serbs made up 40 percent, Bosnian Muslims 38 percent, and Croats 22 percent. In the Bosnian-held elections of February 1992, 99 percent of those voting approved the move towards independence. Bosnian Serbs boycotted the election. In March, Karadzic's forces began

killing Muslims in rural areas. On 5 April 1992, Karadzic's army erected barricades and began artillery attacks against Sarajevo.

US Intervention

Many Bosnians thought war crime reports in the Balkans would provide a moral imperative for the US to intervene in the former Yugoslavia. President Bush and later Clinton failed to take action against the atrocities committed in Yugoslavia because they did not recognize Yugoslavia as a vital US interest. Many perceived the US as being unwilling to risk American lives while thousands of Bosnians were being persecuted. President Bush thought European Union (EU) leaders should take responsibility for European affairs. In January 1992, President Bush told an interviewer, "I don't want to send young men into a war where I can't see that we are going to prevail and prevail quickly."⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was against involving US troops to stop the Serb-Croat conflict. He contended that US military intervention must result in a quick, decisive victory with few casualties. He did not believe this was possible while the civil war continued in Bosnia. This relevance was not lost on international observers both sympathetic and antagonistic to the US.

In September 1991, the UN voted for an arms embargo on all Yugoslavia and soon followed with the UN Security Council agreeing with the deployment of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to separate Serb and Croat armies and to monitor the latest cease-fire agreement. Some 14,000 UNPROFOR soldiers, mainly British and French, reached Croatia. However, after Bosnia's February 1992 elections, war again broke out between Bosnian Serbs and Croats.

As the war continued, the UN sent 1,100 UNPROFOR troops to protect humanitarian supplies arriving at the Sarajevo airport. In July, the UN Security Council approved an airlift of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo to arrive on US C-130 cargo planes. The UN was reluctant to use force against warring parties even when Serbs blocked aid convoys, refused to move heavy weapons away from the Sarajevo airport, and violated the no-fly zones and agreed safe havens. The UN called the mission “peacekeeping,” yet there was no peace or cease-fire in Bosnia to keep.

Graphic reports of atrocities committed by both sides outraged world opinion and resulted in a US Congressional debate on aid to Bosnia. Congress authorized \$55 million for refugee aid and an additional \$50 million for military aid if the UN lifted the 1991 arms embargo. For the next three years the US Congress continued to argue to lift the arms embargo and provide military equipment to the Bosnian Muslims in an attempt to level the playing field. Britain and France opposed the idea of lifting the embargo. They were clearly angered at the idea because although the US would not risk ground troops, it was trying to influence the UN policy on Bosnia. Britain and France felt lifting the embargo would ultimately put their troops in danger while the US sat idly by.⁶ President Bush continued to reject proposals for a US-led military intervention in Bosnia. He opposed NATO air strikes but did accept a NATO action to establish no-fly zones and a tighter naval blockade to enforce the UN arms embargo. This again brought heated debates from France and Britain. They felt the US was not willing to risk the lives of US ground forces, yet enforcing a no-fly zone would endanger their troops by retaliatory strikes against UNPROFOR. President Bush compromised and the UN Security Council passed a resolution establishing a no-fly zone, providing for limited NATO’s retaliation

for violations, and restricting NATO attacks against ground forces without approval of the UN civil authority in the Balkans.

Shortly after losing the presidential elections in November, President Bush committed US naval forces to assist NATO's naval blockade of the Balkans. This was the same period that US forces began deploying to Somalia. President Clinton assumed office with near-crisis situations in Somalia and Bosnia, as well as in Haiti.

During the campaign, Clinton criticized Bush's Bosnia policy, building the perception that he was willing to take a stronger role in the Bosnia peace process. However, once in office, he initially maintained Bush's policy of relying on the UN and EU to develop policies and solutions for the Bosnia conflict. Bosnian Serbs violated a UN order to stop bombarding Srebrenica and consequently, in April 1993, Clinton agreed with the UN in establishing safe havens for UNPROFOR in order to protect Muslim civilians. However, Serb forces began ignoring the safe havens UN failed to act against them for the violations. The leadership of UN forces on the ground did not act for fear of retribution against their soldiers on the ground. Failing to act caused the questioning of UN resolve and increased the occurrence of violations. It also caused greater difficulties during later negotiations because Serbs ignored diplomatic threats of military action. The warring factions held the perception that the leadership of the UN forces feared the risks involved with military intervention and would not act. This problem will later reappear during negotiations to solve the Kosovo conflict.

In May 1993, President Clinton again proposed the "lift and strike" policy, which was an idea to lift the arms embargo on the Croatian side and strike against any violations of UN no-fly zones or safe havens. European leaders again rejected this proposal

because they felt that more military equipment in Bosnia would increase the fighting, endanger UNPROFOR personnel, and weaken the UN peace talks. Although Clinton was willing to offer US ground forces to implement a peace treaty that all Bosnia factions approved, his offer was not seen by allies as risking American lives in the way the “lift-and-strike” proposal endangered European and Canadian forces in Bosnia. For the remainder of the year, the US continued to follow the policy of letting the UN and EU solve Bosnia’s problems. US problems in Somalia and Haiti during September and October of 1993 clearly took the focus away from Bosnia and European problems.

The US slowly became more committed to a greater role in Bosnia after the UN-EU peace efforts again failed in 1993. During late 1993 through early 1994, Bosnia Croats began an offensive against both Bosnia Serbs and Muslims. This triangular conflict increased the danger to UNPROFOR troops who were trying to remain neutral while providing relief and negotiating a cease-fire agreement. After Serbs shelled a marketplace in Sarajevo in February 1994, killing sixty-eight civilians and wounding many more, the US requested the use of air strikes to stop the attacks on Sarajevo. Following the US request, NATO gave the Serbs ten days to remove all heavy weapon systems from within twenty kilometers of the center of Sarajevo. Bosnia Serbs complied only after receiving pressure from Moscow to meet the NATO demands. On February 28, US planes under NATO control shot down four Serb planes violating the no-fly zone. This set the precedence for future NATO response to no-fly zone or safe-haven violations.

Following the February attack on Sarajevo, Charles Redman, a US State Department representative, convinced the Bosnia Muslims and Croats to stop fighting

each other and focus their efforts against the Bosnia Serbs. Both agreed that their fighting benefited the Serbs. A cease-fire agreement was implemented between the Muslims and Croats and on 18 March 1994 the Croat-Muslim Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established. President Clinton offered economic aid to the new federation and vowed to help enforce the peace agreement through NATO.

Former President Jimmy Carter negotiated a cease-fire agreement between the Federation and the Bosnia Serbs on 28 December 1994. This cease-fire was only a temporary pause in fighting and an opportunity for both sides to regroup and recover during the wet winter season. In March 1995, Bosnia Muslims ended the cease-fire by attacking Mount Vlasic in an attempt to regain lost territory.⁷ Serbs responded by attacking Muslims located in UN safe havens at Tuzla and in eastern Bosnia. NATO was outraged at these attacks and warned the Serbs to stop the attacks or face air strikes. However, this threat was hollow because UN and NATO forces could not agree on the use of force. President Clinton sent Ambassador Robert Frasure to Belgrade to gain Serb President Slobodan Milosevic's recognition of the Federation and to help pressure the Bosnia Serbs into accepting the latest peace proposal. Milosevic would not recognize the Federation but he did ask the Bosnia Serbs to respect the UN safe havens. The Bosnia Serbs responded by intensifying attacks against the safe havens. This resulted in NATO finally approving air attacks against Serb ammunition storage sites and military installations.

In retaliation for the NATO-led airstrikes, Serb forces took as many as 300 UNPROFOR soldiers hostage to use as human shields against further air strikes. This caused a temporary halt to NATO attacks for fear of causing UN casualties. Bosnia Serb

leader Radovan Karadzic sent a letter to the UN stating that if a NATO attack continued it would render further negotiations impossible because UN and NATO would be perceived as enemies to Bosnia Serbs.⁸ French President Jacques Chirac urged the pulling back of UN forces to defensible positions and more flexible rules of engagement to allow soldiers the use of force when necessary. Chirac also recommended the US deploy attack helicopters to help redeploy UN troops and to protect UN safe havens.⁹ In June 1995, at the request of US Ambassador Fraser, Milosevic convinced Bosnia Serbs to release the UN hostages taken in May.

President Clinton approved the proposal to reposition UNPROFOR but would not send the requested attack helicopters for fear of the threat to US forces and congressional opposition. Clinton did send eight warships and an aircraft carrier to the Adriatic but would not deploy ground forces until all warring factions signed a peace agreement.

The US appeared ready to take a more assertive role in Bosnia. However, the Serb antiaircraft downing of USAF F-16 pilot Scott O'Grady reversed this stance. The US was later criticized for its acts of elation after O'Grady's rescue. After congressional criticism on the US role in Bosnia, President Clinton stated that US Air and Navy forces would only help UNPROFOR troops requiring emergency extraction. The perception that the US would not risk casualties in support of foreign policy continued to grow. By August 1995, British forces deployed an additional 1,500 troops with tanks and heavy artillery and France deployed 4,000 troops with attack helicopters.

The change in UNPROFOR activities was a step in the right direction but did not solve Bosnia's problems. Fighting around Sarajevo and elsewhere throughout Bosnia intensified. In a retaliatory strike, the Serbs attacked the less-defended safe havens where

Dutch UNPROFOR forces waited for British and French reinforcements. NATO air support was requested but, by the time the UNPROFOR commander approved the request, it was too late. Bosnia Serbs took the town of Srebrenica, a UN safe haven, and rounded up over 25,000 Muslims. Thousands of Muslim men and boys were tortured and killed while the women and girls were beaten and raped.¹⁰

After the Srebrenica massacre, President Clinton decided the US would take a more dominant role in finding an agreeable peace settlement. In August 1995, Clinton assigned Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke as the chief negotiator for the US. The US National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, and Peter Tarnoff of the State Department presented President Clinton a new policy idea. After six years of conflict between Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, a single multinational Bosnia state was unrealistic. The new policy sought to develop a Bosnia government made up of three cultural entities. It also urged the UN and European allies to use coercion and to take the lead in negotiations for a Bosnia peace. Finally, the report recommended direct US involvement in Bosnia peace and cease-fire negotiations and aggressive NATO air strikes against Bosnia Serbs to force them to accept peace.

Bosnia Serb mortar attacks on an open market in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995 outraged the international community. These attacks killed at least thirty-eight people and wounded eighty others.¹¹ The UN called the attack brutal and unacceptable. The US denounced the attack and Richard Holbrooke pushed for retaliatory air strikes.¹² On 30 August, more than sixty aircraft began systematic attacks on Bosnia Serb positions around Sarajevo while French and British artillery units targeted the Serb barracks

southwest of Sarajevo. This would be the intense, sustained air campaign for which the Muslims and Croats had hoped for over the last three years.

Holbrooke and his negotiation delegation met with Milosevic eight hours after the beginning of air strikes. Milosevic presented Holbrooke a document, signed by the Bosnia Serb leaders, appointing him as the head of the joint Yugoslav-Republika Srpska delegation for all future peace talks. This document was critical to the peace process, virtually granting Milosevic total power over the fate of the Bosnia Serbs.¹³ Milosevic immediately asked for the halt of NATO air strikes; however, the US and NATO allies were unwilling to stop the strikes until the Bosnia Serbs guaranteed they would stop the attacks on Sarajevo. On 1 September, Holbrooke recommended Washington agree to a short pause in the NATO air strikes. He requested the condition for the pause be that if the Bosnia Serbs did not agree to lift the siege of Sarajevo, air strikes would resume immediately. Although the US was concerned that once they stopped the strikes they would not be able to start them again, NATO suspended its bombing in Bosnia on the afternoon of 1 September 1995.

Holbrooke and his team began shuttling from one headquarters to another in attempts to formulate a peace plan and negotiate a cease-fire agreement. The three warring factions agreed to a meeting held in Geneva to discuss what would hopefully be a lasting peace agreement. Although Bosnia Serbs threatened UN and NATO personnel if the bombing resumed, Holbrooke continued to push for the resumption of NATO air strikes until the Geneva peace conference. He was concerned that without the resumption of the attacks, the Serbs would not withdraw their forces from around Sarajevo, NATO would appear to be making false threats, and once again the peace process would fall

apart. On 5 September, NATO air strikes against Bosnia Serb forces resumed. On the day before the meeting at Geneva, NATO intensified attacks in Bosnia. Bosnia Serb ammunition storage facilities, military installations, communications sites, and other key facilities were hit hard.¹⁴ On 8 September, the Geneva meeting was held with the leaders of all three warring factions sitting at the same table for the first time in years. Although the meeting was successful, there was much to complete before the meeting in Dayton and a lasting peace agreement achieved.

Concern continued over the NATO attacks against Bosnia. US military officials were concerned that they would run out of approved targets, having to re-bomb targets already been hit in the past. No one liked the idea of risking US air assets on targets that would have diminishing returns. The major concern of Holbrooke's was that they would run out of targets before achieving a peace settlement. He was also concerned that stopping the bombing would weaken their ability to negotiate. On 14 September 1995 after nearly ten hours of negotiations, Holbrooke secured the signatures of the Bosnia Serbs on a fairly agreeable peace proposal. That same day, NATO stopped the air strikes against Bosnia Serbs. Within a month, the official cease-fire went into effect and the true road to peace began. The official signing of the Dayton Agreement occurred in Paris on 14 December 1995. President Clinton announced on 3 December 1995 that he had authorized the first US soldiers to deploy to Bosnia. The US would ultimately send 20,000 US soldiers to Bosnia as part of the larger, 60,000 personnel, NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). To date, the US has not sustained one war casualty in Bosnia and still maintains at least 6,000 soldiers in Bosnia as part of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR).

Outcome for Bosnia

The Bosnia conflict was the first true test of President Clinton's policy on deploying US military forces. Many issues influenced his decisions, to include pressure from the UN to provide assistance; pressure from Congress and the American public for US involvement in Bosnia; events leading up to the death of eighteen US soldiers in Somalia; recommendations by the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff; and finally pressure from NATO and other allies.

Perceptions and Other Outcomes of US Intervention

The six years of fighting between Bosnia Muslims, Croats, and Serbs all but destroyed the country of Bosnia. Thousands of innocent civilians, along with military adversaries, died during the conflict. The ineffective use of UNPROFOR troops and the inability of the European Union to help negotiate a lasting peace in the country resulted in the US finally taking the lead in peace negotiation. The events of Somalia and the desire to not risk US soldiers lives on issues that did not have clear national interests resulted in the slow US response in resolving the Bosnia conflict.

Three effects resulted from the perception of American casualty aversion. First, the allied perception caused tension between the US and its allies. Second, it increased difficulties in diplomatic efforts. Third, the perception caused allies to question US resolve in pursuing its own interests.

The Bosnia conflict strained relations between Great Britain, France, and the US. Great Britain and France argued against the US recommendation of simultaneously lifting the UN arms embargo for the Bosnia Muslims and conducting air strikes against Bosnia Serb military targets. Britain and France based their argument on their perception

that although the US was willing to conduct surgical air strikes against ground targets, it feared putting American soldiers on the ground where French and British forces operated as part of UNPROFOR and risked retaliatory strikes by the Serbs against them. At one point, both Great Britain and France contemplated the withdrawal of their soldiers from Bosnia after the US made it clear it was not going to risk ground forces until there was a signed peace agreement.

The US and UN unwillingness to accept the risks involved by enforcing no-fly zones and UN safe havens caused difficulties in diplomatic efforts. The perception of Bosnia Serb leaders was that the US and UN would not back their threats of air strikes. When they did attack Serb planes violating the no-fly zones, the Serbs took UNPROFOR troops hostage and made threats against US and UN personnel if air strikes occurred. This initially caused a halt to UN air strikes while UN negotiators attempted to secure the release of the hostages.

Reflecting on the US experience in Somalia, the US would not commit ground forces until all warring factions agreed to a permanent cease-fire agreement. Many Bosnians died while the world waited for such an agreement. The US became apprehensive toward the use of air assets after Bosnia Serbs shot down USAF pilot Scott O'Grady.

The incident caused the US to limit future air operations to emergency situations only. Additionally, the US led NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) would not allow the issue of war crimes to undermine its peace keeping mission. NATO officials felt their mission in Bosnia was to maintain the peace and resisted "mission creep" from pulling them into hunting down war criminals. The perception of US aversion to casualties was

blamed for the lack of emphasis placed on capturing accused Bosnia war criminals.

According to author James V. Arbuckle, the real reason NATO did not want to be involved in arresting war criminals was undoubtedly the concern for the casualties that might be incurred in attempting the arrests.¹⁵

US intervention in Bosnia demonstrated the effects resulting from the Somalia-caused reemergence of US casualty aversion. The international community and internal US advocates pressured the US to intervene in Bosnia even while the US recovered from the failures of Somalia. America's attempt to avoid intervention in Bosnia, its failure to act decisively when action was warranted, and the extreme restrictions it placed on the use of military force caused the continuance of the perception of American casualty aversion. If the aversion to casualties causes US policy makers to fear taking warranted action, the future credibility of the US as a military power will be questioned and its diplomatic power degraded.

The following chapter will describe the US involvement in Kosovo, events that perpetuated the casualty aversion perception, and how the perception affected the military operation.

¹Lester H. Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992-1998* (Claremont: Regional Books, 1998), 69.

²Marko Milivojevic, *Descent into Chaos: Yugoslavia's Worsening Crisis* (London: The Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1989), 23.

³Brune, 75.

⁴Steven Metz, *The American Army in the Balkans: Strategic Alternatives and Implications* (Carlisle: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 4.

⁵Brune, 85.

⁶Ibid., 98.

⁷Ibid., 100-103.

⁸James Bjork and Allan E. Goodman, “Yugoslavia, 1991-92: Could Diplomacy Have Prevented a Tragedy,” Case 467, *Pew Case Studies in International Affairs* (Washington: The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy), 5.

⁹Brune, 104.

¹⁰Ibid., 105.

¹¹Cable News Network, “International Leaders Condemn Sarajevo Attack” [article on-line]; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/august95/8-28/reaction.html>; Internet; accessed on 14 January 2002.

¹²Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, rev. ed. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1999), 98.

¹³Ibid., 106.

¹⁴Ibid., 138.

¹⁵James V. Arbuckle, *The Pearson Papers*, Paper Number 2, “The Level Killing Fields of Yugoslavia: An Observer Returns” (Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press of The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Center, 1998), 22.

CHAPTER 4

YUGOSLAVIA AND US INTERVENTION

Kosovo

The last two chapters identified the reemergence of the international perception of America's aversion to casualties and discussed the effects this perception had on diplomatic and military operations. This chapter will address US intervention in Kosovo and how previous operations continued to shape US policies in foreign affairs and the international community's perceptions of the US.

Early Kosovo

Serbia became a part of Yugoslavia, a federation of Southern Slav republics, after World War I. When Tito came to power, he made Kosovo an autonomous region. When Tito died, Albanians were Kosovo's dominant ethnic group, making up nearly 85 percent of the population.

In March 1981, during student protests in Pristina, Serb-led police forces put down an Albanian protest with tear-gas and baton charges. Thirty-two students were injured and many more arrested. Within days, tanks began appearing on the streets, increasing the discontent amongst Kosovo Albanians and causing protests throughout the region. To control the situation, Serbia sent special police security units to implement curfews and a general state of emergency in Kosovo was declared.¹

Gradually, political pressure grew resulting in a purge of Communist Party officials. The Albanian Communist leader Mahmut Bakalli was expelled from the Party in July and the president of the provincial presidium, Xhavid Nimani, was forced to

resign. The government attacked Albanian intellectuals for the nationalist tendencies in their writings.

Late in 1986, the Serb press began to report on a memorandum drawn up by members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. One of its claims was that Albanian-caused physical, political, juridical, and cultural genocide of the Serb population in Kosovo represented Serbia's worst defeat since 1804.² The document concluded that the government must establish objective, lasting conditions for the return of the exiled Serb people and that the integrity of the Serb people must be the overriding concern of future policy.

The Rise of Milosevic

In April 1987, Serb Party president Ivan Stambolic sent Milosevic to Polje, Kosovo to talk to a protesting group of Serb and Montenegrin activists. His political career catapulted forward when he told the angry Serbs that "no one should dare to beat you!"³ With the crowd chanting "Slobo, Slobo!" he began speaking in defense of the sacred rights of the Serbs. Exploiting the issues in Kosovo, Milosevic quickly turned himself into a national leader, enabling him to take over the leadership of the Communist Party. By the end of 1987, he took over as the president of the Serbian League of Communists.

Milosevic spent the next year consolidating his power. He forced the resignation of the local Party leadership in Vojvodina and Montenegro and arranged for the replacement of the two leading Albanian Party leaders in Kosovo. In early 1989, the Serb assembly began preparing amendments to the constitution, gaining control of Kosovo's police, courts, and civil defense, as well as social and economic policies. This

caused Kosovar Albanians to begin a new series of labor strikes and protests. In retribution, Serbia began sending troops into Kosovo and declared a state of emergency.⁴ Serb police arrested hundreds of protestors and striking workers. Some were charged with “counterrevolutionary endangering of the social order,” an offense with a maximum punishment of death.⁵ By June 1989, Serbia transferred 25,000 police personnel to Kosovo.

Under the new Serb March 1990 “Programme for the Realization of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo,” many measures were taken to strengthen Serb rule in Kosovo. Albanians were encouraged to find work in other areas of Yugoslavia and sales annulled of property to Albanians by departing Serbs. On 2 July 1990, Albanian members of the provincial assembly met in the street outside the assembly building and passed a resolution declaring Kosovo an equal and independent state. In retribution, Serb authorities dissolved the assembly and the government.⁶

Arbitrary arrest and police violence became routine throughout Kosovo. In 1994, 15,000 people were detained for up to seventy-two hours for questioning alone. Serbs implemented a strategy of persuading Albanians to leave Kosovo by making their conditions of life intolerable.⁷ By the summer of 1996, some 19,000 Bosnia Serb refugees settled in Kosovo. Nearly 150,000 Albanians also left Kosovo, settling in other Western European countries.

The Beginning of International Intervention

In February 1998, Serb armored units were beginning to mobilize while police troops began moving towards the Kosovo border. US special envoy Robert Gelbard traveled to Belgrade in late February to discuss the issue with Milosevic. In private talks,

Gelbard indicated Serbia had a choice to cooperate in resolving the Kosovo problem and be rewarded with the lifting of sanctions or face further isolation.⁸ Milosevic was a key party in the peace negotiation for Bosnia. His firsthand knowledge of the US involvement in Bosnia gave him the perception that the US would not intervene in the ongoing conflict. Just days after Gelbard's departure, Serb forces launched a major offensive against key positions of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA was a staunch opponent of Milosevic and the Serb domination of Kosovo. Within a week, the Serb offensive killed eighty-five Albanians, including forty-four women and children.

The United States and European countries were concerned about Kosovo and the consequences of the ongoing violence. However, they failed to act to prevent the escalation of violence. Similar to its policies in Bosnia, the US did not see a vital US interest in Kosovo, was unwilling to risk American lives to force peace, and thought European countries should take the lead in solving European problems. However, in December, US Congress and the international community began pressuring President Clinton to take action on the Kosovo problem. President Clinton warned Milosevic of potential retaliatory strikes against Serbia if attacks continued. However, Serbia did not take this threat seriously because the US did not back threats made earlier during this conflict or in settling the conflict in Bosnia. Manon Tessier and Michael Fortmann wrote in Paris' *La Revue Internationale et Strategique* that the US demonstrated in Yugoslavia their unwillingness to take decisive actions to back diplomatic threats, thus reducing its diplomatic power.⁹ During these initial months of the conflict, the Clinton administration never attempted to reach a NATO consensus on the issue of military force for two reasons. First, the Clinton administration thought the allies would not support the use of

force and, second, it was concerned that the use of force was not publicly sustainable in the US. This was a lost opportunity to end the conflict before the violence escalated.¹⁰ Had more determined diplomatic efforts been made, backed by credible threats of military force, Serbs may have realized that both the US and NATO intended to take whatever actions necessary to end the conflict. NATO foreign ministers announced the commissioning of military advice on support for UN and OSCE monitoring activities as well as on NATO deployments in Albania and Macedonia at a meeting held in Luxembourg in late May. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana stated that NATO would consider further deterrent measures if the violence continued and would exclude no options.

In October 1998, President Clinton's focus turned toward his impending impeachment hearings, leaving the Kosovo issue in the hands of Madeline Albright and the State Department. Albright secured a resolution from the United Nations Security Council imposing an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, with only China abstaining.

On 15 May 1998, Rugova met with President Clinton and Vice President Gore and pleaded for direct American action in Kosovo to halt the escalating violence.¹¹ Clinton made no concrete promises of American intervention.

Milosevic's forces escalated their attacks throughout June. Yugoslav police detachments, ordered to pacify troublesome rebel strongholds, began shelling villages in western Kosovo. Thousands of terrified villagers fled across the border to Albania. Claiming the region was on the brink of open war, Foreign Minister Pascal Milo of Albania appealed for NATO intervention. On 7 June, British Prime Minister Tony Blair called on Clinton and Russian president Boris Yeltsin to discuss the possibility of using

force in Kosovo. Serb actions forced the allies to consider the additional measures they had warned. NATO defense ministers directed its military committee and the SACEUR to conduct air exercises in Albania and Macedonia to demonstrate NATO's capability to rapidly project power, develop options to halt or disrupt the violent repression and expulsion in Kosovo to create the conditions for negotiations toward a peaceful settlement, and provide advice on possible support for UN and OSCE activities and possible NATO deployments in Albania and Macedonia.¹² However, continued disagreements between NATO allies on what degree of military action should be taken resulted in a deferral of any decision on military force. The inability of the NATO alliance to agree on the necessity to gain the UN's authorization for the use of military force in Kosovo also stalled any consideration of military action. Meanwhile, Serb forces continued their attacks, destroying village after village.

In October 1998, Richard Holbrooke, US special envoy to the Balkans, went to Belgrade in an attempt to persuade Milosevic to end attacks on the Kosovar population. By this time, Serbs had forced some 300,000 Albanians from their homes. Holbrooke gained Milosevic's commitment to cease attacks on civilians and to begin withdrawing some of his security forces from the region. Milosevic also agreed to grant access to humanitarian relief agencies, allow refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes, and to allow an international presence in Kosovo to verify compliance with this agreement.

In November 1998, signs in Kosovo did not look promising. The KLA had returned to the areas the Serbs vacated. The Serbs were not following through with their promise to remove heavy weapons and police from Kosovo. By late December, Serb

forces were resuming their offensive actions against Kosovo Albanians. On 16 January, Ambassador William Walker, an American diplomat who was the head of the OSCE mission, called General Wesley Clark and reported the finding of a massacre of Albanian civilians. It had been less than two months since Milosevic signed the agreement with NATO and Serb forces were blatantly breaking it. NATO's credibility was at risk. Javier Solana secured NATO's agreement for air strikes and held the authority to take action. He sent General Clark to Belgrade in a last attempt to persuade Milosevic to heed the threat of NATO airpower and to uphold the promises he made to NATO in October 1998.

General Clark had three terms to discuss with Milosevic: (1) Serbia was to allow the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia, Louise Arbour, to inspect the massacre of Racak, (2) US Ambassador Walker, who Milosevic wanted out of Yugoslavia for prematurely condemning Racak a massacre, was to remain in Yugoslavia, and (3) Milosevic was responsible for meeting promises he had made earlier to Richard Holbrooke. Milosevic was not meeting the promise to remove police troops and heavy weapons. Milosevic would not agree to any of these three terms. In conclusion of this meeting General Clark ensured that Milosevic completely understood NATO air strikes would be the consequence for not agreeing to NATO's demands.¹³

Rambouillet Conference

Still hesitant to use military force, the NATO allies agreed to one last diplomatic effort to find a solution that would end the violence and provide greater autonomy to Kosovo. NATO held a conference in the French village of Rambouillet, just outside

Paris. The conference was a failure, with no reached agreement between NATO and the warring factions.

The failure of the Rambouillet talks left the allies no other choice but to back up their frequent threats of military action. NATO believed that a demonstration of NATO's military capability would force Milosevic back to the bargaining table.¹⁴ What these continued talks did was allow Serb forces additional time to prepare for NATO air attacks and to step up their attacks on Kosovo Albanians.

On 20 March 1999, the OSCE verification team left Kosovo without incident. The Serb military and police immediately intensified their attacks on Kosovo Albanians as soon as the OSCE had left. International television networks broadcast video footage of Albanian refugees streaming barefoot from the village of Srbica. On 22 March, Milosevic rejected Holbrooke's final warnings of what would happen if he continued to refuse the Rambouillet plan. On 23 March, Secretary General Solana signed the execution order to begin air attacks against Serbia. There were three main issues of concern in the final preparations for the air war. First was to prevent the loss of aircrews. This restriction drove the decisions on tactics, targets, and weapons systems. The second issue was to strike the military and police activities on the ground as rapidly and effectively as possible. Without the use of ground forces, the dispersion of Serb ground forces would cause this goal to be nearly impossible. It was difficult to target Serb forces involved in house-to-house ethnic cleansing from thousands of feet in the air. The final concern was to protect US ground forces and elements of the international community deployed throughout the region. The focus of all of these measures was to limit friendly casualties while conducting the air war against Serb forces.¹⁵ Even as final preparations

were completed, many NATO representatives hoped that a short show of force would be sufficient to persuade Milosevic to return to the negotiation table. This wish did not happen. Instead, Milosevic escalated the conflict, forcing more than one million refugees from their homes. In the evening of 24 March 1999, US naval ships launched the first Tomahawk missiles against Serb targets.

All Serb restraint ended as the first bombs and cruise missiles struck their targets. Milosevic claimed there were no refugees before the bombing started and that the Albanians were fleeing to avoid NATO air strikes. On the contrary, Milosevic ordered the Serb Army to strike against the remnants of the KLA and anyone that could be supporting them. Serb forces began house-to-house attacks. In addition to the military and police forces, local Serbs committed similar atrocities. A decisive NATO ground force could have prevented much of the suffering and bloodshed of the Albanian people. President Clinton had ruled out this option and the international perception rose that the US believed Albanians were not worth the life of an American.¹⁶ Osama Saraya wrote in his editorial in Cairo's Al-Ahram Al-Arabi that the US President was so insistent that the campaign in Kosovo be conducted without US casualties he failed to accomplish the main goal of putting a stop to the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. He believes that Kosovar Albanians bore the worst results of America's refusal to accept the risks of ground war.¹⁷ The deployment of US allied ground forces would have prevented the freedom of movement of the Serbs forces, forcing them to defend or withdraw, and thus prevented or reduced their ability to implement their plan of ethnic cleansing.

The Air Campaign

NATO's air campaign followed a three-phased plan. During phase one, air attacks focused primarily on Yugoslavia's integrated air defense system and then its command and control and other military sites. Phase-one attacks consisted of the firing of roughly 160 cruise missiles and the participation of 350 NATO aircraft.¹⁸ To avoid friendly casualties, NATO pilots flew at night and were not allowed to fly below 15,000 feet, making target identification difficult.

US and NATO officials expected this first round of attacks to compel Milosevic to return to the negotiation table. However, Milosevic planned to drag the war on as long as possible in hopes that public opinion would cause the Western Alliance to fracture. He believed that even small numbers of casualties on the side of the alliance would cause countries like the US to back down.¹⁹ NATO officials had counted on an early termination of the attacks and had only planned three days' worth of targets, roughly ninety targets in all. This shortage of targets caused unnecessary risk to NATO pilots. In order to maintain the tempo of the air campaign, the lack of targets resulted in re-striking already damaged or destroyed targets with limited military value.

Making matters more difficult, President Clinton announced in a press conference shortly after the conclusion of the first day of the air campaign that he did not intend to deploy American ground forces. This announcement undermined the current military operation and limited the diplomatic options of coercive threats towards Milosevic. Milosevic had firsthand diplomatic experience with the Western Alliance during his position in negotiations to end the conflict in Bosnia. His perception was that NATO air strikes would be limited in nature and would last for a short duration--in his apparent

calculation--only until his own propaganda attempts could show the world the atrocities NATO's bombing was causing to innocent civilians.

By 27 March, NATO entered phase two of its air campaign. During this phase, attacks hit a wider set of military targets below the forty-fourth parallel. The forty-fourth parallel bisects Yugoslavia with Belgrade and Novi Sad above it and Montenegro and Kosovo below it. Although this opened a wider set of targets, it made the destruction of Yugoslavia's integrated air defense system impossible because allied planes were not allowed to attack Serb weapons systems in northern Yugoslavia. Phase two targets consisted of military depots and airfields as well as forces in the field. The focus of NATO's main effort was on operations and installations supporting the paramilitary, military, and police forces in Kosovo.²⁰

During this phase of the war, Yugoslav forces shot down a US F-117 stealth fighter, the only NATO fixed-wing aircraft lost during the entire war. It was also the first loss of one of the time the US most valued stealth aircraft. By the end of March, NATO authorized alliance aircraft to conduct daylight attacks and to attack limited targets above the forty-fourth parallel. This shift in targeting began what became known as phase two-plus. The alliance plan had been to reserve targets above the forty-fourth parallel and dual-purpose targets until a formal adoption of phase three by the North Atlantic council. However, several NATO countries were unwilling to authorize phase-three attacks. Meeting a compromise, NATO allies granted Secretary-General Solana approval authority for specific categories of targets that were within phase three of the campaign plan. These targets included targets in Belgrade, civilian infrastructure with military applications such as television and radio transmitters as well as leadership targets, such as

the residency of Milosevic. The council asked that Solana informally consult those countries with particular concerns before approving certain targets and that he and General Clark, the NATO Allied commander, solicit input on sensitive targets before attacking them.²¹ Although the compromise greatly increased the number and value of targets attacked, the cumbersome process increased the time required for target approval, caused last-minute target cancellations, and wasted sorties.²²

On 31 March 1999, Serbs captured three US soldiers along the Kosovo-Macedonia border. This incident raised questions as to whether Milosevic would use NATO soldiers as hostages, like the Serbs had done in Bosnia in 1995. In General Clark's book, *Waging Modern War*, he wrote, "This was the kind of thing the Serbs were very good at, and from discussions on the margins at Dayton, I knew they doubted our resolve to withstand casualties. This was their way of fighting back."²³ Having been a part of the Bosnia negotiation team, General Clark understood the perceptions Milosevic held towards the US and NATO resolve. In order to win this war, he would have to strengthen the alliance's resolve and overcome this perception. Reverend Jesse Jackson flew to Belgrade and successfully negotiated the release of the three soldiers after 30 days of captivity.

Apache Attack Helicopters

During the first month of the air war, General Clark recognized that the dispersal of Serb forces caused great difficulties in attacking them with fixed wing aircraft flying above 15,000 feet. He needed a better capability for close fighting. He requested the US deploy its Apache helicopters from Germany. The Army validated that Apache crews had completed their training in Germany as a deep attack team and were proficient in

their wartime tasks. However, the senior leadership of the Army demonstrated apprehension towards authorizing their deployment.²⁴

Without a ground force, the Apaches would deploy without their traditional means of acquiring targets. Additionally, loss rates for the attack helicopters were estimated at five percent per sortie or higher. These facts, plus doubts about finding Serb armored vehicles the open and vulnerable to Apache fire, raised questions whether the likely effectiveness of the helicopters justified the risk. However, General Clark was able to generate enough support for President Clinton to authorize the deployment on 4 April 1999.

The Apache deployment took far longer than expected. Basing the helicopters in Macedonia as originally planned proved infeasible, causing a shift in their deployment to Albania. Limitations in Albania's airfield capacity also caused further delays. The first Apaches arrived on 21 April. The US sent more than 5,000 troops to provide engineering and maintenance support, force protection, and advanced firing using army tactical missiles and multiple-launch rocket systems. The total cost for deploying the Apaches was roughly \$500 million, close to 20 percent of the total US war cost.

Continued concerns of casualties and loss rates and the lack of ground forces for target acquisition prevented the use of the attack helicopters throughout the war. The deployment of the Apaches, known as Task Force Hawk, was a great disappointment for both the US Army and NATO. The highly visible fact that the helicopters were not used, despite public discussions of their impressive capabilities, continued to build the perception that NATO was unwilling to risk Western lives while thousands of Kosovar Albanian were being persecuted. During post-deployment training, the US lost two

helicopters and the lives of two pilots. This was the only NATO loss of life during the entire conflict.²⁵

Although not used, some believe the Apaches played an important role in the war. The mere fact of the deployment gave the Serbs added concern. It may have forced them to concentrate many of their portable surface-to-air missiles near the Kosovo-Albania border, taking them away from areas where they could have threatened NATO's fixed-wing aircraft. The deployment also made NATO's later threats of a possible ground invasion more convincing to Milosevic.

War Within Yugoslavia

NATO brought impressive advances in technology to the war. NATO forces had stealth aircraft, sophisticated electronic jamming capabilities, high-technological reconnaissance and command and control assets, and a wide array of weaponry. Most bombs used in the early phases of the campaign were precision guided with pilots identifying targets in the dark using advanced night vision capabilities. However, these advantages did not translate into the quick, decisive battlefield success planned for by the Western Alliance. British Defense Secretary Robertson said that the military objective of the attacks against Yugoslavian forces was to reduce the Serbs' capacity to repress the Albanian population and to avert a humanitarian disaster. However, NATO was ineffective in protecting ethnic Albanians within the borders of Kosovo. NATO's bombing appeared to have lifted a constraint on Milosevic. There was no longer a reason for restraint. He began his plan to systematically reengineer the ethnic makeup of Kosovo. Serb forces began to drive Kosovar Albanians from their homes with efficiency and speed once NATO began its attacks. Leaving little doubt of Serb desires to change

the province's demographic mix, they removed Albanians from cities such as Pristina and Pec in a carefully planned and executed process of ethnic intimidation and relocation.

On the ground in Kosovo, Serb military leaders were able to disperse their forces, making them harder to target from the air. Many of the forces involved in the Albanian intimidation were impossible to target from the air. Small bands of Serb paramilitary forces, too small to identify or target with air attacks, systematically worked from house to house, driving the Albanians out. Serb forces beat, robbed, raped, or killed those Albanians that did not leave. Because alliance leaders continued to state that they would not escalate to a ground war, Milosevic was almost pushed to implement his plan at a more rapid pace to drive the Albanians out of the country before NATO changed its policy. By April, Serb units had forced nearly 1.3 million Albanians from their homes.²⁶ This was nearly three-fourths of the prewar population of 1.8 million, making Milosevic's ethnic expulsion campaign one of the most successful and comprehensive since World War II. Death toll estimates range from 5,000 to 11,000.

Initially, NATO bombing rallied Serb support around Milosevic. Serb armed forces felt a stronger sense of public support and resolve. The united public gathered in Belgrade where they demonstrated patriotism and defiance against the Western alliance. Most Serb leaders were unwilling to criticize or acknowledge the atrocities being committed against Kosovar Albanians, while Milosevic managed to silence most of the independent media critics.

Serb riots in front of the US embassy in Macedonia created support for Yugoslavia. NATO also had to deal with antiwar demonstrations in Greece. The Greek population strongly opposed the NATO attacks. Greeks felt solidarity with the Orthodox

Christians of Serbia, but Greek leaders also felt a strong sense of responsibility to their NATO allies. The three newest NATO members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, also felt public pressures against the war effort. Although disagreements within the alliance often slowed the decision-making process, the alliance held strong.

Russian Reaction to NATO Attacks

NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia provoked a major crisis with Russia. Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was en route to Washington when Vice President Gore called to inform him that attacks against Yugoslavia were imminent. He had his plane immediately turn around and return to Moscow. Shortly after the beginning of the attack, in an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, the Russian UN Ambassador demanded an immediate cessation of NATO's unacceptable aggression. Public opinion polls in Russia showed the quickly growing anti-American sentiment, doubling from 23 to 49 percent in the first few weeks of the war.

On 26 March, Russia introduced a draft UN resolution, cosponsored by Belarus and India, calling for a halt to NATO attacks and the resumption of negotiations. Twelve members of the UN Security Council opposed the resolution.

In March, Russia sent Naval ships into the Mediterranean, where they could easily enter the Adriatic. This deployment caused considerable tension between the alliance and Moscow and raised concerns that Serb forces may receive intelligence on NATO flight operations from Russian ships. Russian President Boris Yeltsin went as far as to warn that NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia could lead to world war.

Although relations between the alliance and Russia were tested, Russia and NATO maintained diplomatic relations. Russian Prime Minister Primakov received

NATO's support for a trip to Belgrade in late March to attempt to find a solution to the hostilities. These combined diplomatic efforts continued throughout the war, resulting in a joint US, Russian, and European effort that finally convinced Milosevic he could no longer ignore negotiations.

Conclusion of the WAR

On 6 May 1999, at their meeting in Bonn, G8 Foreign Ministers agreed to five principles resolving the Kosovo crisis. These principles demanded a verifiable stop to Serb military action in Kosovo, withdrawal of Serb forces, an international military force in Kosovo, refugee return, and acceptance of a political framework based on Rambouillet. Milosevic agreed to these principles on 3 June and the UN encapsulated the principles in UN Security Council resolution 1244 on 10 June.²⁷

On 10 June 1999, on a televised address to the nation of Yugoslavia, Milosevic proclaimed that the aggression was over and peace had prevailed over violence. His primary reason for claiming victory was that the agreed peace settlement guaranteed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The war had closed the issue of the possible independence of Kosovo. In Milosevic's national address he claimed that Yugoslavia persevered and succeeded in defending its nationhood. He also felt victorious because the international force deployed to Kosovo would be under the auspices of the UN, not the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as originally planned in the Rambouillet accords. He believed that because of the UN control, Russia would be in a better position to protect Serb interests with its veto power. Finally, Milosevic agreed to the terms for peace because, at the time, he believed it was his best opportunity to present the situation as a victory for Yugoslavia and still power.

He also hoped that his agreement to the peace terms would delay or prevent his appearance before the war crimes tribunal in the Hague.²⁸

After seventy-two days of air attacks, the war ended with both NATO and Milosevic claiming victory. NATO won the war, but it was a limited victory. No single decisive battle ended the war. NATO did not win the quick decisive victory it had planned. The NATO alliance had believed air attacks would only take days to end the conflict; however, days became months before the constant bombardment of Yugoslavia caused enough damage for Milosevic to capitulate. NATO met its goal of stopping the violent repression and expulsion of Albanians in Kosovo; however, this was only after over 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were killed and some 1.5 million displaced. At the end of the war, Milosevic still held power and declared victory for Yugoslavia.

Effect of the Perception

Similar to the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia, US involvement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Mindanao continued to demonstrate how the US conduct of war continued to build on the perception that the US was unwilling to risk casualties. All three conflicts brought the US unwillingly into a military deployment where it was difficult to define the US national interest. From the beginning, President Clinton perpetuated the perception by declaring that deploying US ground forces was not an option. In an article in the Athens' newspaper, *I Kathimerini*, Kostas Iordanidis wrote that in Kosovo, the US proved it can only carry out military operations from a safe distance and "as a result, the United States' status as a credible power has been dealt a severe blow."²⁹ Only attacking by fixed-wing aircraft above 15,000 feet, failing to utilize the Apache attack helicopters,

and the unwillingness to back up threats of military action during early diplomatic efforts are all examples of circumstances that could be viewed as a fear of casualties. All leaders should try to limit casualties. However, the problem arises when the enemy uses the perception of casualty aversion as your center of gravity. Milosevic and the Serb forces held this perception and acted on it. They dispersed their forces in Kosovo, causing difficulties for NATO forces to target and attack their ground forces. Because ground forces were not an option for NATO, he formed a strategy to speed up ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and wait out NATO air attacks. It was his belief that if his country could wait long enough, cause a limited number of NATO casualties, and use propaganda tactics to portray the air war as a criminal act against his country, public opinion and internal conflict would cause NATO's resolve to fade. Consequently, the perception of casualty aversion caused the air war to continue much longer than the NATO Alliance predicted. It also prevented the use of NATO ground forces early enough to prevent the atrocities and ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar Albanians.

Finally, Adriono Sofri, a journalist for Rome's *La Repubblica*, wrote that the US has a "zero death" mentality. Authors from China and many Arab countries agree with Sofri's conclusion that this mentality is one of the strongest motives for hatred and contempt towards the US. "It is the idea of a cowardly bully, crystallized in high-altitude strikes and invisible aircraft."³⁰

There are many examples that nations, such as Pakistan, Egypt, China, and Great Britain, perceive the US as being averse to casualties. Some countries see this as an exploitable weakness while others believe this perception has caused the US to think it could win any war without casualties and thus become more willing to use its air forces

aggressively. Xu Sheng, a journalist for the Beijing *Jiefangjun Bao*, wrote that the US demonstrated in Kosovo that it is willing to attack and violate a sovereign country's borders. He fears that the strategies used in the Yugoslavian conflict have created a false sense of invincibility in the US and that this sense may provoke the US to attack China.³¹

Chapter 5 will consist of an analysis of how America's intervention in the Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo conflicts has shaped the international perception that the US will not risk casualties. It will identify what trends are apparent in regards to the perception and how the perception affects US international relations.

¹Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 334-5.

²*Ibid.*, 340.

³*Ibid.*, 345.

⁴Jane Perlez, "A Bitter Struggle in a Land of Strife," *New York Times* [article on-line]; available from <http://nytimes.com/learning/general/specials/kosovo/article1.html>; Internet; accessed on 23 November 2001.

⁵Noel Malcolm, 348.

⁶See Malcolm and Perlez.

⁷Malcolm, 352.

⁸Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 10-11.

⁹Manon Tessier and Michel Fortmann, "The United States: Change of a Superpower in Post Cold War Context," Paris *La Revue Internationale et Strategique* (in French) 1 April 2001, FBIS Document ID: EUP20010503000218.

¹⁰Daalder and O'Hanlon, 27-31.

¹¹Dusko Doder and Lousise Branson, *Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant* (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 242-47.

¹²Daalder and O'Hanlon, 32.

¹³Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 156-63.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 64-6.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 184-5.

¹⁶Doder and Branson, 152.

¹⁷Osama Saraya, "Why Have Americans Failed To Lead the World," Cairo *al-Ahram Al-Arabi* (in Arabic) 7 June 1999, FBIS Document ID: FTS19990608000408.

¹⁸Daldar and O-Hanlon, 42-48.

¹⁹Doder and Branson, 253.

²⁰Daldar and O'Hanlon, 68.

²¹*Ibid.*, 116.

²²United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures, July 2001, GAO-01-784 (Washington: 4).

²³Clark, 229.

²⁴Clark, 43.

²⁵Daldar and O'Hanlon, 235.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 97-105.

²⁷Stephen T Hosmer, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Molosevic Decided to Settle When He Did* (Santa Monica: RAND 2001), 115-20.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 147-50.

²⁹Kostas Iordanidhis, "Kosovo, a Sad Anniversary," Athens *I Kathimerini* (in Greek) 25 March 2000, 10, FBIS Document ID: GMP20000326000175.

³⁰Adriano Sofri, "When US Soldiers Die," Rome *La Repubblica* (in Italian), 11 January 2002, 1, 17, FBIS Document ID: EUP20020111000054.

³¹Xu Sheng, "Accurate Attacks Will Dominate Future Battlefields," Beijing *Jiefangjun Bao* (in Chinese), 22 June 1999, 6, FBIS Document ID: FTS19990713001922.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTION

US interdictions in the Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo conflicts have perpetuated the international perception that Americans are unwilling to risk casualties. Through research analysis, this chapter will answer the question of how this perception affects US foreign relations and how the perception influences the actions or intent of its allies and potential adversaries. Foreign sources provided illustrative examples as the basis for this analysis. These examples also provide a framework for predicting how countries or nonstate actors may act toward the US.

Research identified five trends resulting from the international perception of America's aversion to casualties. They are:

1. Aversion to casualties challenges US international leadership and credibility
2. Aversion to casualties may cause a false sense of invulnerability, resulting in preemptive attacks by the US.
3. America's strategy of zero casualties directly affects US foreign relations.
4. US casualty aversion is an exploitable weakness.
5. Past acts of US casualty aversion continue to influence America's way of fighting the war on terrorism.

Leadership and Credibility

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, no peer competitor opposes American interests. The world looks to the US to provide leadership in shaping world affairs. Many authors from the international community believe the perception of American aversion to

casualties is degrading the credibility and leadership of the US in the geopolitical environment.

N. C. Menon of the *Hindustan Times* says that the outcomes of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War should have ushered in an era of unquestionable American military and geopolitical superiority. However, this assumed superiority is eroding. He states, “Unless the US makes haste to undertake a drastic reappraisal of its military and political options, it could, not too far down the road, be in for some disastrous surprises.”¹ He also believes that small threats or conflicts will challenge America’s international leadership and credibility thus, these small threats will become vital to US interests if the US desires to maintain its sole superpower status.

Although the US cannot take responsibility for every disagreement or conflict in the world, it cannot allow the aversion to casualties to prevent its engagement in world affairs. The US must analyze a conflict, determine the second-level and third-level effects it may cause, and predict the outcome of the conflict if the US does not intervene. When the US determines intervention is required, it must act quickly and decisively to prevent escalation of the crisis.

Osama Saraya wrote, in an editorial for Cairo’s *Al-Ahram Al-Arabi*, that the war in Kosovo demonstrated that Americans are unwilling to take the responsibility of leadership. The NATO alliance failed to achieve its primary objective of stopping the Serb atrocities against Kosovar Albanians because the US would not deploy ground forces for fear of casualties.²

The US early declaration that ground forces were not an option allowed the Serbs to disperse their formations and continue their plan of ethnic cleansing at a determined

pace. By dispersing their force, the Serbs complicated the already difficult NATO task of attacking ground forces by aircraft flying above 15,000 feet.

America's French and Greek allies agree that the US aversion to casualties limits its ability to freely use military power, resulting in a downward trend in US diplomatic and geopolitical effectiveness. They believe it is no longer enough to demonstrate military power and to use it unilaterally to dominate others; there is a need to have the moral authority to legitimize military action. The US unwillingness to risk casualties detracts from the legitimacy of its actions. The US demonstrated in Yugoslavia its unwillingness to take decisive actions to back diplomatic threats. The power of the military to deter and coerce is less credible since the use of ground forces is becoming a less viable option. Finally, America's reservations about committing troops to conflict zones for fear of suffering losses considerably undermine the credibility of American commitments on international security issues.³

America's unwillingness to commit ground forces results in the international community questioning US legitimacy, credibility, and commitment to international security issues. When the leadership of America believes in the necessity to intervene, it should do so with the commitment of all forms of US national power. US leaders cannot allow casualty aversion to dominate their decision-making process.

Fear of Preemptive Strike by US

Fears during the Cold War resulted in the nuclear arms race aimed at maintaining an equilibrium of nuclear capabilities. The understanding of nuclear annihilation prevented either side from committing a preemptive nuclear or conventional attack. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US no longer has a peer competitor. Due to current

US hegemony and its strategy demonstrated in past conflicts, some countries, like China, fear the US may conduct a preemptive strike against it.

Xu Sheng, of Beijing's *Jiefangjun Bao*, wrote that America's aversion to casualties drives its strategy of quick, decisive victories. The US demonstrated in its involvement in the Kosovo conflict that it is willing to attack and violate a sovereign country's borders. China fears that the strategies used in the Yugoslavian conflicts have created a false sense of invincibility in the US; that the US can fight a war without casualties. This false sense may provoke the US to attack China.⁴

Because of this fear, the two senior colonels in the Chinese army Qian Liang and Wang Xiangsui developed a new military theory, "Unrestricted Warfare," that advocates going beyond the limits set by all rules and criteria and using all means in countering technologically advanced military forces.⁵

The People's Liberation Army Literature and Art Publishing House published the theory of unrestricted warfare. Liang's and Xiangsui's theory means war without limits or boundaries, a combination that breaks all limits and methods and makes use of nonmilitary means to attack the enemy from every angle, at every level, and in every field until the war aim is met. Liang says, "Unrestricted Warfare first of all breaks through the boundaries of the military sphere and future war will be of this tendency."⁶

Their theory proposes that they should formally turn nonmilitary activities, such as computer hacking, financial intrusion, and media propaganda, into methods of warfare. The theory also identifies the real threat posed to military powers, such as the United States, by terrorist elements and lists terror warfare as one of its twenty-four varieties of warfare.

Liang and Xiangsui believe that the Kosovo war exposed the military conservatism and political faults of the US. The US would rather conduct a protracted war with military technologies than test the strength, morale, bravery, cleverness, and resourcefulness of their military. The US defeated Iraq and Yugoslavia because the latter waged traditional war. Had they waged an unrestricted war, they would have attacked Europe and the US with guerrilla warfare, forcing the suspension of air attacks. Unrestricted warfare is a strategy designed for poor countries to be victorious over militarily superior countries without matching America's defense spending.

Although it is doubtful the US would conduct an unprovoked preemptive attack against China, the relevance of these sources is that they demonstrate how the perception of America's aversion to casualties affects the thoughts and actions of potential US adversaries. Perhaps such perceptions might cause China to more readily risk attacking US interests.

Effects on International Relations

The international perception that America conducts a strategy of zero casualties affects US relations with its allies and effects the actions of its potential adversaries. This concern may be divided into two subcategories--animosity towards the US and friction between the US and its allies.

Italy, Pakistan, India, and Egypt all agree that America's zero casualty strategy is one of the strongest motives for hatred and contempt of the US.⁷ Adriano Sofri, journalist from Rome's *La Repubblica*, wrote that suicide terrorism has introduced an absolute weapon against the US cowardly strategy of using high-altitude strikes and

invisible aircraft.⁸ Sofri's view of terrorism as an asymmetrical means of countering US technologies agrees with the new Chinese theory of unrestricted warfare.

Dr. Iffat Malik warns, in his article "Victory at What Price," that the US war on terrorism could prove to be a catalyst to greater hatred towards America.⁹ He argues that the US strategy of long range bombing has killed numerous, innocent Afghan people. The reason he says America's strategy will build hatred towards the US is that long range bombing was not the only option available. Had it been the only option, the number of civilian casualties may have been an acceptable unavoidable evil. However, that was not the case. Dr. Malik believes a ground force may have more been capable of distinguishing between combatants and innocent civilians and limiting collateral damage. He also wrote that when faced with the choice between risking US soldiers or Afghan civilians, the US did not hesitate to sacrifice the latter. When the US chooses to risk the lives of all but its own soldiers, it must be prepared to face growing anti-American outrage throughout the world.

These examples indicate the potential growth of hatred toward the US because of the perception that America's fear of casualties prevents it from deploying ground forces. Again, when the leadership of America decides to intervene in foreign conflicts, it should do so with all forms of US national power. When the US keeps certain forces out of the fight, it must concentrate on its information campaign to explain to the international audience the reasons it does not fully committing its forces. The US must counteract the perception that the US believes forces from other nations are more expendable than US soldiers. Although not completely successful, the US has attempted this perception reversal in the war in Afghanistan. Northern Alliance forces were the initial ground

forces used against the Taliban. The US provided information to the international media on US Marine and Special Operations forces activities within the country. This presented US ground forces as active fighting participants. Because the US was not the majority ground force in the operation, the success of counteracting the perception was limited.

During the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, the perception of America's zero casualty strategy caused friction between the US and its French and English allies. During the conflict in Bosnia, France agreed with British outrage when President Clinton proposed the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia Muslims and conducting air strikes against Serb forces. France complained the US was unwilling to commit ground forces while French and British troops on the ground in Bosnia faced Serb opposition or attacks in retribution for NATO air strikes.¹⁰

Again, during the Kosovo conflict, France voiced its disagreement with the US unwillingness to accept risk by agreeing with Britain's recommendation to deploy ground forces. France believes, had NATO ground forces been deployed early in the conflict, Serb forces would not have been free to carry out the number of atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians.

US casualties and the political decision to withdraw forces from Somalia caused US apprehension on intervening in Bosnia and Kosovo. The US incremental participation in these two conflicts resulted in British and French forces being on the ground earlier than the US. Both countries took exception to US recommendations that may have had a greater impact on their forces. When the US is not fully committed to a foreign operation, it must be more cognizant of and yield to the decisions of the countries with deployed forces. Because the US did not have forces deployed when it made the

“lift-and-strike” recommendation, it did not have the legitimacy or credibility to influence the decision.

Exploitable Weakness

Research has shown the greatest concern should be that potential US adversaries perceive America’s aversion to casualties as an exploitable weakness. Past and future adversaries agree that targeting the US military or its civilians breaks US resolve.

For nearly ten years, it has been believed that Osama Bin Laden has been involved in terrorist activities around the world, targeted at US military and civilians. Terrorist attacks such as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1994 attempted bombing of the US embassy in Bangkok, the 1996 bombings aimed against US forces in Riyadh and Khobar, the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are all examples of attacks in support of the *Jihad* or holy war Bin Laden has declared against the US and its Allies. In 1998, Bin Laden called for a *Fatwa* (religious decree) urging *Jihad* against Americans. At the time, the Saudi dissident gave three reasons for the *Jihad*--US occupation of the Arabian Peninsula, the continued US led strikes against the Iraqi people, and America’s war against Iraq. Bin Laden said the US goal is to fragment and weaken all the states of the region and through this, guarantee Israel’s survival and the continuation of the brutal attacks against the Muslims around Jerusalem. Bin Laden declared that God’s ruling to kill Americans and their allies, civilian and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim in order to liberate the two holiest Mosques and force the infidel’s armies to leave the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.¹¹

Bin Laden understands his forces could never match the organization and technologies of US military forces. Instead, he chose terrorism as an asymmetrical means of attacking the US. In the past, the US conducted limited air or cruise missile strikes in retribution for terrorist attacks against the US. Based on his perceptions of America's aversion to casualties, Osama bin Laden may have believed the risk and extent of America's counteraction to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US would be acceptable. He did not believe the US would have the resolve for a full-scale war against the Taliban or his Al-Qaeda organization. He probably anticipated only rhetoric, a heightened civil criminal investigation, and some distant and limited Tomahawk attacks against evacuated training camps.

Targeting and attacking US soldiers or civilians as a means of breaking America's will to fight is only one means of exploiting the US aversion to casualties. In an article from *The Hindustan Times*, N. C. Menon wrote that US military success in the Persian Gulf lulled the American public into thinking its forces will always win rapidly and decisively with a minimum number of casualties. The US demonstrated the effectiveness of smart bombs and Tomahawk missiles against Iraq's command and control structure. While the US continues to improve these technologies, its potential adversaries are procuring or developing hardened subterranean command and control facilities, weapons of mass destruction, and information warfare capabilities to counter US advantages.¹²

The targeting of US soldiers and civilians to break the resolve of the nation or the concentration on defensive measures to survive US air and missile strikes are both serious concerns to the security and national interests of the US. The belief that an adversary can kill a few Americans and thereby cause US forces to withdraw increases

greatly the threat to individual soldiers. If this perception continues, it will not matter if a soldier is an infantryman or a clerk, all American soldiers will be targets of opportunity.

Potential adversaries have analyzed US strategy and are preparing defenses to counter US technological advantages. As US adversaries develop protection for high payoff targets, the US will find it more difficult to achieve the victories it has grown accustomed to with long-range, standoff weapons.

Continued Influence on America's Way of Fighting

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 struck at the most vital national interest of the US, homeland defense. Early in the war on terrorism it appeared the US would reverse the international perception that America is averse to casualties. President Bush and the senior military leaders have made statements to the media claiming casualties as the cost of protecting the nation. However, it appears the past international perceptions may be carried forward through the war on terrorism.

Initially, after the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States, the United Kingdom thought the US would overcome its casualty aversions. However, the US-led operations in Afghanistan have brought continued concerns of US casualty aversion.

Bruce Anderson clearly articulates in his article in London's *Independent* that the US had to attack Afghanistan. "If America had held back, the rest of the world--including the Arab world--would not have attributed this to judicious restraint, but cowardice."¹³ He believed that had the US not taken action, everyone would have concluded the US was so traumatized by the fear of casualties that it was incapable of conducting military operations, even with such a vital interest in jeopardy. Additionally, the US would have lost its allies in the region. A country unwilling to defend itself is

incapable of defending others. Finally, Anderson wrote, “We have good grounds for believing that America once again has armed forces which are prepared to take casualties, and a public opinion which is ready to applaud their courage in doing so.”¹⁴

Four months later, Bruce Anderson’s opinion changed while covering Dr. Henry Kissinger’s visit of the SAS’s Stirling Lines headquarters. According to Anderson, soldiers of the SAS complained to Dr. Kissinger that, because senior officers in America’s army feared friendly casualties, air to ground attacks were conducted above 12,000 feet. Additionally, it was their opinion that Osama bin Laden was allowed to escape after intense fighting at Tora Bora because of fears that an American soldier may die in the operation.¹⁵ After the battle at Tora Bora, the British SAS believed they knew where Bin Laden was and had planned an operation of envelopment to capture or kill him. They claimed US general officers would not approve the operations because they wanted US forces involved in the capture of Bin Laden but the operation was too dangerous for US forces. Anderson said US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has made his dissatisfaction on how US military operations have been conducted in Afghanistan clear to his senior military leaders. Anderson also recommended the removal of casualty averse, senior US officers, to be replaced by officers with a warrior spirit who understand and accept that military operations are dangerous.

The examples used to illustrate the five trends of international concerns demonstrate how the perception of America’s casualty aversion directly impacts US effectiveness as a world leader. These trends are reversible; however, American leadership must address these issues and demonstrate US commitment to world affairs.

The continued study of international perceptions is vital in order to predict how individual countries and nonstate actors may act in the future.

¹N. C. Menon, "Decline in American Power Noted, Analyzed," Delhi *The Hindustan Times* (in English), 2 December 1996, FBIS Document ID: FTS19970626002297.

²Osama Saraya, "Why Have Americans Failed To Lead the World," Cairo *al-Ahram Al-Arabi* (in Arabic) 7 June 1999, FBIS Document ID: FTS19990608000408.

³Manon Tessier and Michel Fortmann, "The United States: Change of a Superpower in Post Cold War Context, Paris *La Revue Internationale et Strategique* (in French) 1 April 2001, FBIS Document ID: EUP20010503000218; and Kostas Iordanidhis, "Kosovo, a Sad Anniversary," Athens *I Kathimerini* (in Greek) 25 March 2000, 10, FBIS Document ID: GMP20000326000175.

⁴Xu Sheng, "Accurate Attacks Will Dominate Future Battlefields," Beijing *Jiefangjun Bao* (in Chinese), 22 June 1999, 6, FBIS Document ID: FTS19990713001922.

⁵"New Book Published by PLA Literature and Art Publishing House Calls for Countering Military Powers by Hook or by Crook," Hong Kong *Ming Pao* (in Chinese) 2 July 1999, A13, FBIS Document ID: FTS19990702000375.

⁶Chiang Hsun and Liu Ning-jung, "Completely New Method of Unrestricted Warfare," Hong Kong *Yazhou Zhoukan* (in Chinese) 20 September 1999, 38-40, FBIS Document ID: FTS19991016000039.

⁷See Adriano Sofri, "When US Soldiers Die," Rome *La Repubblica* (in Italian) 11 January 2002, 1, 17, FBIS Document ID: EUP20020111000054; and Saraya Menon *Islamabad The Nation* (Lahore Edition) (in English) 31 October 2001, "General Franks' Visit," FBIS Document ID: SAP20011031000085.

⁸Sofri.

⁹Iffat Malik, "Victory at What Price?" *Karachi Dawn* (Internet Version-WWW) (in English), 28 December 2001, FBIS Document ID: SAP20011228000062.

¹⁰Lester H. Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia 1992-1998* (Claremont: Regina Books, 1998), 99-100.

¹¹Osamah Bin Ladin, "Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans," *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, 23 February 1998 [reprinted on-line]; available from <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/fatwah.htm>, Internet; accessed on 14 March 2002.

¹²Menon.

¹³Bruce Anderson, "This Time the Americans are Ready for the Bodybags; 'This Bold Strike was Intended to Convey the Impression That US Pressure Would Be Relentless,'" London *The Independent* (Internet Version-WWW) (in English) 22 October 2001, FBIS Document ID: FTS20011022000178.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Bruce Anderson, "SAS Unpleased with Conduct of Operations in Afghanistan, Speak with Doctor Kissinger," *London The Independent* (Internet Version-WWW), 25 February 2002.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the end of the Cold War, the US is the only remaining superpower. With this status comes the responsibility of leadership in international affairs. The international community perceives that America is unwilling to risk casualties in support of foreign policy. Many examples demonstrate the negative effects this perception has on US international relations. This perception degrades US authority, legitimacy, and credibility as a world leader.

Often, perceptions are more relevant than facts because a nation or nonstate actor deals with other nations based on its perceptions of those nations' power and national will. Therefore, it is important to analyze and understand other nations' perceptions of the US in order to determine, predict, and understand their probable actions. The international perception that the US is averse to casualties is reversible. However, it will take a convincing information campaign and a demonstration that America will not allow an aversion to casualties dictate its foreign policies.

The 1993 hasty withdrawal of US forces from Somalia caused the reemergence of the international perception that America was unwilling to accept casualties in support of military operations abroad. The results of US intervention in Somalia caused US hesitation to intervene in Bosnia. Although the US believed European countries should take the lead in solving problems in their own region, the international perception was that the US was no longer willing to risk casualties in support of foreign conflicts. When the US did finally intervene, it did so timidly, restricting the use of US military forces and

refusing to deploy ground forces until all parties involved agreed to peace. During the conflict, the US angered its allies by making military recommendations when US forces were not on the ground to share the risks associated with its recommendations. The manner in which the US deployed its forces and the extreme constraints of force protection implemented by the US resulted in the perpetuation of the casualty aversion perception.

In the late 1990s, the conflict between the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians reached crisis level. Mounting international and internal pressures called for US intervention. Again, the US entered a conflict with great hesitations. A decisive NATO ground force could have prevented much of the suffering and bloodshed of the Albanian people. However, President Clinton's early declaration ruled out the option of using ground forces to stop the atrocities being committed against the Albanian people. The US hesitation in intervening and the refusal to consider the use of ground forces continued to amplify the perception of US casualty aversion.

US intervention in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo resulted in five basic trends of international concerns regarding the perception of US casualty aversion. It is important for US leaders at all levels of military service and the civilian leadership of the nation to understand the five trends and how they affect others' perceptions of the US. These trends are as follows: (1) Aversion to casualties challenges US international leadership and credibility; (2) The US's presumed sense of invulnerability may result in preemptive attacks by the US; (3) A presumed strategy of zero casualties may directly shape US foreign relations; (4) Potential enemies can see US casualty aversion as an exploitable

weakness; and (5) Past acts of apparent US casualty aversion continue to influence America's war on terrorism.

As stated, the perception of US casualty aversion is reversible. Thus far, during the war on terrorism, President Bush and senior military leaders have attempted this perception reversal through an information campaign. When President Bush addresses the nation, he attempts to prepare the US public for a long, drawn out war where the US will sustain casualties. When the US sustained casualties, the President and military leaders have portrayed casualties as the unavoidable cost of freedom in the war against terrorism. However, past acts of US casualty aversion appear to continue influencing America's way of fighting the war on terrorism. British forces blame US casualty aversion for allowing Osama bin Laden to escape capture. Countries, such as Pakistan, India, and Egypt, agree that America's aversion to casualties caused the development of a zero casualty strategy that motivates hatred and contempt for the US. They believe the fear of casualties has prevented the US from deploying a decisive ground force to Afghanistan; therefore, the US relies on the Northern Alliance and soldiers from other countries to fight as surrogates for the US. They fear the resulting perception will be that the US believes other countries' soldiers are more expendable than American soldiers. The US cannot ignore international perceptions. The importance of studying international perceptions is to identify trends in these perceptions in order to predict the future actions of international actors. From these trends, US leaders must develop a strategy to begin reversing this international perception. Leaders at all levels must be concerned about US casualties in military operations and limit these losses. However,

leaders cannot allow casualty aversion to interfere with achieving US national or military objectives.

Recommendations for Further Study

In the development of this thesis, many topics for further study became apparent. Analysis should be done on what a war without ground forces means to the theories of modern warfare. When the US fights from the air, how does this strategy build resentment and anti-American feelings in countries throughout the world? An in depth study of works like Ian Liang's and Wang Xiangsui's 1998 military theory of "Unrestricted Warfare" should be conducted. This theory is important in that it identifies what they believe to be US exploitable weaknesses and ways to defeat technologically advanced forces such as the US. US military planners and leaders could use this theory as a means of understanding current Chinese philosophies of warfare. Research into public opinion and how civilian and military leaders perceive this opinion would be valuable to understand how the perception of public opinion affects US policy and military leaders' decisions. An analysis of when limiting friendly casualties is no longer considered force protection and becomes aversion to casualties would be beneficial in identifying whether or not the US is in fact unwilling to accept casualties. Finally, continued research on individual nations' perceptions of the US are important in order to predict and understand the actions these nations take or how they may act in the future.

APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

To answer the thesis question this study utilized the following approach: (1) identifying and describe the root factors causing the international perception that the US is averse to casualties; (2) identifying and describing the effects the perception has on US foreign relations (3) describing the effects the perception has on military operations; and (4) developing conclusions and recommendations based on the findings of the research.

The US involvement in Vietnam resulted in over 59,000 US soldiers killed during the protracted war of attrition. Never before was the American public subjected to graphic scenes of the battlefield. Advances in communications and the media brought the war into the living rooms of the American public. America found itself in a war that many felt it could not win, one that was widely protested at home, and one in which the political and strategic objectives were ill defined. Unlike the Vietnam War, the US involvement in Somalia resulted in fewer than thirty casualties. Yet, when eighteen soldiers were killed on 3 October 1993, President Clinton announced the withdrawal of US forces within forty-eight hours of the first scenes being broadcast across US television. The US quickly turned from actively pursuing the capture of General Aidid to negotiating with him in order to minimize future casualties until the US left Somalia. Because of this reversal, many believe Somalia sparked the reemergence of the perception that the US is averse to casualties.

During the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo, this perception continued to grow. The US refused to deploy ground forces until the warring factions in Bosnia signed a formal

peace agreement. Threats of military action were not fulfilled and the US proposals to lift the arms embargo for the Bosnia Muslims while conducting air strikes against Serb military targets angered France and Great Britain. The point of contention was the US did not have soldiers on the ground to share the threat of retribution for such a policy. Excessive relief from both President Clinton and the military when one US casualty, F-16 Pilot Scott O'Grady, was prevented caused NATO allies to further doubt US resolve. Kosovo operations continued this perception when the US announced that ground forces would not be a military option. This limitation not only promulgated the perception that the US was unwilling to risk casualties, it also shaped the strategy of Serb forces within Kosovo and frustrated diplomatic activities. Without the threat of a ground invasion, Serb forces dispersed, causing great targeting difficulties and limiting the effectiveness of air strikes. The historical analysis of these conflicts provides evidence of the effects casualty aversion has on America's foreign relations and military operations.

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service was a primary source in providing illustrative examples of the perceptions that people from other nations hold in regard to America's apparent aversion to casualties. Research focused on a selection of countries and nonstate actors as examples of US allies' and potential adversaries' perceptions. Analysis identified key elements of the casualty aversion perception and how this perception affects the actions of the international community.

APPENDIX B

LITERATURE REVIEW

The sources reviewed represent a fraction of the readily available information discussed on the topic of the effects of the apparent international perception of the US aversion to casualties. The passionate writing of many authors reflects the relevance of this subject. It is important to recognize this perception and understand the possible affects it may have on US international relations and how it may affect the actions of America's potential adversaries. This literature review uncovers important concepts of this perception, highlights the root causes of this perception, illustrates how they have affected US foreign military operations, and provides a sampling of the perceptions of people from other nations. Material reviewed consists of books, magazine articles, and translated foreign news articles from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) that is available on line for authorized users. Information on how to obtain a FBIS account is available at the FBIS home page. This literature review follows the format of the thesis--Introduction, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and an analysis of illustrative examples of perceptions.

Max Boot wrote an informative article in *The Wall Street Journal* that discusses Presidential nominee George W. Bush's position on the overseas deployment of US military forces. He highlighted the implications of excessive aversion to casualties to military leaders. Boot related public attitude toward military deployments in Somalia and analyzed the implication of excessive aversion to casualties. This article is a useful source in comparing Bush's opinions before and after he entered office.

“A look at Casualty Aversion; How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer,” is an article coauthored by Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, found in the 7 November 1999 edition of *The Washington Post*. The relevance of their article is that it identified the causes of the casualty aversion perception. Many believe that public opinion is the driving force behind this perception. This article along with articles written by Steven Kull (“Misreading the Public Mood,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, March-April 1995) and Matthew Cox (“America Willing to Risk Your Live,” *Army Times*, 6 July 1999) discussed the analysis of surveys that have identified the cause of the perception to be in the realm of the senior political and military leadership and not with the American public itself. Peter Feaver stated that surveys conducted by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies show the general public is more willing to tolerate combat losses than civilian policy makers or senior military officers. The survey was conducted with 4,900 Americans, drawn from three groups--senior military officers, influential civilians, and the general public. The data showed that although senior military and civilian officials believe the American public demands a casualty-free victory in order to support military operations abroad, the American public is more realistic in understanding and accepting the risks involved in the use of the military. Feaver pointed out that although it is important to limit American casualties, it would be a mistake to believe the US can continue to influence the world and use its military to defend national interests without risking casualties. He also believes it is a mistake to think the American public is unwilling to take risks when its leaders show that risks are inevitable and necessary in order to accomplish the mission. Feaver went on to discuss how, during

operations in Somalia, the CNN effect influenced government officials far more than it did the American public.

Mathew Cox agreed with Peter Fever's article in that the American public is not casualty averse. In his short article he discussed a survey conducted on public support for using ground troops in the war in Kosovo. The author discussed the civilian leadership's decision not to allow the use of ground troops, how it affected the course of the conflict and the importance of mission success compared to the number of possible casualties. From this article one can begin to see how US adversaries or terrorists can use this perception to further their cause.

T. S. Mundy wrote a monograph for the Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, titled "Casualty Aversion: Dispelling the Myth." His monograph discussed the perception among the military leadership that casualty aversion limits the military in the performance and accomplishment of its mission. He attempted to dispel the myth that Americans will not support military operations when there is a chance of US casualties. He believed that this perception of public support has had the effect of limiting risk taking in military operations and that this risk aversion may cause more casualties in future conflicts. Mundy applied three criteria to case studies of the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and Somalia Operation Provide Hope in analyzing the origin of casualty aversion. First, Mundy analyzed polling data to identify the changing nature of public opinion during military operations. Second, he analyzed the nature of US war fighting capabilities to determine if the ability of the US military today, through technology, has become so thorough and efficient as to persuade decision makers into

believing that war can be waged without risking friendly casualties. Finally, he reviewed the perceptions of decision makers at the senior military and civilian leadership levels to determine whether an aversion to casualties has evolved over the years among this group. The author attempts to determine whether or not there is a myth that has led senior military and civilian leaders to believe the US should only commit forces when friendly casualties can be minimized. Although this monograph does not discuss international perceptions, its value to this research is in identifying the root cause of the casualty aversion perception and how it is important to understand how this perception affects US military operations.

As a starting point for research into the casualty aversion perception, Bob Woodward's book, *The Commanders*, is a good analysis of the National Command Authority and how decisions at the highest level are made. It also illustrated that the US did not appear to be casualty averse during the Gulf War. During Operation Desert Storm, casualty estimates were as high as 20,000 soldiers. Military commanders took actions to mitigate the possibilities for casualties, but did not allow the aversion to casualties to affect the military operation.

Woodward details the development of the National Command Authority and the selection of the US military's most senior leadership during the Bush administration. The period covered is from the first discussions of operations in Panama through the buildup and beginning of Operation Desert Storm. He provided insight to what the nation's senior leadership was considering prior to offensive operations. With friendly casualty estimates as high as 20,000 soldiers, the author detailed what US military and civilian leaders used as criteria to determine when to begin offensive operations and how to limit

US casualties. He also discussed the battles that were ongoing between Congress and the White House in order to ensure the deployment of an overwhelming force and the decisive victory. This was a useful source in developing an understanding of the decision-making process at the highest levels of government.

Jonathon Stevenson's book, *Losing Mogadishu: Testing US Policy in Somalia*, provided an insightful history of Somalia. He began by discussing the environment and culture of Somalia. He then continued with the history of Somalia with illustrative examples of the social and political turmoil of the nation; from the Cold War influence's of the US and Soviet Union through the US operations in Somalia. The final chapters of the book are an interesting discussion of lessons learned by both the US and the international community in humanitarian and peace-enforcement operations, and a discussion of the moral compulsions in foreign policy.

Lester Brune's book, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia 1992-1998*, like Jonathon Stevenson's, was useful as a background study of Somalia. What sets his book apart is: first, it described more of the political discussions of the time period. He talked about the differences in the two presidents and how they made decisions. Secondly, it was valuable to the research topic in that it provided a comparative analysis of how the US approached and conducted operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.

To develop a historical view of Bosnia before the conflict, Lester Brune's book along with Marko Milivojevic's, *Descent into Chaos: Yugoslavia's Worsening Crisis*, and Elinor Sloan's, *Bosnia and the New Collective Security*, provided a range of points of view. Milivojevic provided a very insightful description of Bosnia during World War II

to the beginning of the break up of Yugoslavia. Brune and Sloan provided details of the situation of the conflict and the UN and US intervention.

James Bjork's and Allan Goodman's contributions to the *Pew Case Studies in International Affairs* and Richard Holbrooke's book, *To End a War*, are two sources that were valuable in describing the diplomatic activities during the Bosnia conflict and the peace process that eventually ended the crisis. Bjork and Goodman analyzed the total war and professed that had the international community entered the situation early on, much of the destruction of the war could have been avoided. Additionally, they discuss the problems the UN, NATO, and the US experienced because diplomatic threats were not backed by strong action. This resulted in great difficulties in cohesive diplomacy to push the peace process forward. Richard Holbrooke's book was especially insightful from the perspective of one of the key leaders involved in the peace negotiation process. He also discussed the problems his delegation had in getting NATO and the US to back diplomatic threats with military action. His discussion of the internal dialogue among the leadership of the Bosnia Serbs, Milosevic, and the Bosnia Muslims provided insight to the political and diplomatic process in a time of crisis resolution.

Many articles both in FBIS and the open press on Kosovo explored the perceptions of the US that the international community developed during and after NATO's intervention. Jane Perlez's, *A Bitter Struggle in a Land of Strife*, and Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, are just two of the many books available on the history of Kosovo. Both provided what appeared to be an unbiased overview of the history of Kosovo from the time of Tito through the conflict of the 1990's.

In order to develop an understanding of decision making at the highest levels of the US government, NATO and the military, Wesley Clark's book *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, was used. This was an interesting source because Clark was the US NATO commander responsible for NATO and the US military attacks on Serbia. Clark's personal agenda was clearly apparent in the book; however, the insight he provided as the force commander outweighs these distractions. He discussed the problems he encountered in securing both the NATO and US chains-of-command authorization to conduct operations. Additionally, the challenges he experienced in conducting combat operations against an enemy who knew the US would not agree to deploy ground forces was most valuable for the research topic. Finally, his discussions on the in-service debate over casualty estimates, reasons for not using the attack helicopters, and difficulties in the target approval process were all relevant to the research.

Many articles illustrated the international community's perceptions of America's apparent aversion to casualties. Chapter 5 is an analysis of the casualty aversion using examples of individual nations as evidence of the analysis. These individual perceptions were the most crucial part of the research of this topic. It is from these perceptions that judgments are made on the importance of understanding perceptions and their possible effects.

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